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COMPETITION POLICY AS A
POLITICAL BARGAIN
JONATHAN B. BAKER*
Candidates for President once debated antitrust policy. Disputes about
regulating trusts took center stage in the four-way 1912 election campaign
among President William Howard Taft, former President Theodore
Roosevelt, future President Woodrow Wilson, and socialist candidate
Eugene Debs. Moreover, antitrust enforcement in the decades before
World War II was marked by sharp pendulum swings. In the early 20th
century, the Supreme Court issued decisions breaking up Standard Oil
and American Tobacco. Two decades later, during the 1930s, the antitrust
laws were effectively repealed-only to be revived over the next decade
through a litigation program led by Thurman Arnold at the Justice
Department. By contrast, modern Presidential candidates rarely mention
the antitrust laws, and speeches by the recent leadership of the Federal
Trade Commission have highlighted continuities in antitrust policy over
the past quarter-century that are independent of the political party
in power.1
The decline in the political salience of competition policy over the
20th century is consistent with the political economy explanation for
the evolution of U.S. antitrust policy described in this article. According
to that explanation, antitrust emerged through a political bargain
between two large and diffuse interest groups, consumers and producers.
2
Absent such a bargain, governmental regulatory policy toward business,
set for the economy as a whole, would not be stable. It would fluctuate
* Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University. The author is
indebted to Stephen Calkins, Andrew Gavil, Pamela Jones Harbour, James May, Michael
Meurer, Roger Noll, Bruce Owen, Douglas Rosenthal, Steven Salop, and Kathy Zeiler for
helpful discussions, to participants in the 5th Annual Loyola Antitrust Colloquium, to
Senior Editor Valerie Suslow, Contributing Editor Scott Stem, and an anonymous referee,
and to Gary Lombardo for research assistance.
'William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy Enforcement Norms,
61 ANTITRUST L.J. 377 (2003) (FTC Commissioner); Thomas B. Leary, The Essential Stability
of Merger Policy in the United States, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 105 (2002) (FTC Commissioner).
2 This stylized economic story is formalized and illustrated through a mathematical
example set forth in an Appendix.
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between pro-producer policies that tolerate the exercise of market power
and pro-consumer policies that redistribute wealth from producers to
consumers. An intermediate antitrust policy increases aggregate social
wealth by allowing the economy to achieve the efficiency gains available
from protecting competition, but it is not as advantageous to the favored
interest group or as disadvantageous to the disfavored group. Antitrust
may nevertheless be adopted as an interest group bargain when repeated
political interaction takes place between the interest groups. Such a
bargain can be self-enforcing: neither group would mobilize politically
to replace it for fear of reverting to cycles between pro-consumer and
pro-producer redistributive regimes.
In this way, an efficient social institution, here competition policy, can
arise from coordinated action among conflicting, self-interested interest
groups interacting in the political arena. This result does not arise as the
inevitable byproduct of Coasian bargaining among conflicting interest
groups or evolutionary selection. Rather, coordination emerges as a
possible outcome of repeated interest group interaction.
The political bargain interpretation is consistent with important fea-
tures of the U.S. regulatory experience with antitrust enforcement, partic-
ularly the way that profound disputes over regulatory policy in national
politics, most evident during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, were
resolved by the 1940s. The claim that the U.S. political system reached
a political bargain in favor of competition policy during the 1940s is
also consistent with antitrust's Chicago School revolution, a dramatic
change in antitrust policy implemented by the courts during the late
1970s and 1980s. The events surrounding the rise of the Chicago School
are not interpreted as producers reneging on a political bargain. Instead
they are understood as consistent with the existence of such a bargain:
either illustrating how the bargain was enforced when some attempted
to renege, or else as reform of the method by which the bargain was
implemented aimed at increasing the efficiency gains.
The interpretation of antitrust law as a bargain between consumer
and producer interests provides a new window into the debate over what
welfare standard should be applied in antitrust enforcement. That debate
is commonly framed today as a choice between an aggregate surplus
standard or a consumer surplus standard. Viewing antitrust as a political
bargain suggests an intermediate position: antitrust enforcers and courts
should seek to maximize aggregate surplus, subject to the constraint that
consumers and producers sufficiently share the efficiency gains, at least
on average, so that neither group thinks it can do better by reneging on
the political bargain. In the wake of modifications to antitrust doctrines
[Vol. 73
COMPETITION POLICY
during the past three decades, which largely remove the practical danger
that modern antitrust rules could be exploited by consumers to transfer
rents systematically from producers, this perspective implies that antitrust
law should be enforced today with a qualified emphasis on consumers:
protecting consumers without regard to aggregate surplus unless the
aggregate efficiency costs of doing so would be large. Doing so would
help protect consumer support for the political bargain in favor of
competition policy without undermining producer support and, thus,
would help secure most of the economy-wide efficiency benefits available
from antitrust enforcement.
I. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATORY POLICY
From an economic perspective, regulatory policy making can be under-
stood as the product of interest group competition in the political arena.
The most basic difficulty confronting interest groups seeking to influence
regulatory policy is to overcome collective action problems arising out
of the incentives of individual group members to free ride on the political
participation and lobbying efforts of others.3 Although the determinants
of interest group success in overcoming collective action problems are
not well understood, 4 concentrated interest groups are generally consid-
ered more likely than large and diffuse interest groups to succeed in
doing so. 5 Yet when economy-wide regulatory policy (as opposed to
industry-specific regulation) is at stake, the relevant interest groups-
which we give names like business (producers) and consumers-are best
thought of as large and diffuse. How, in such a setting, can the political
system arrive at a broad and durable regulatory policy framework, and
which interests will benefit?
As will be explained below, competition policy can emerge as a durable
bargain among interest groups, even if those groups are large and diffuse.
3 MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY
OF GROUPS (1965).
4 The positive political theory literature on lobbying does not model how some groups
overcome their free-rider problems while others do not, but proceeds by assuming merely
that some interest groups are able to organize to influence public good allocation in
their favor. TORSTEN PERSSON & GUIDO TABELLINI, POLITICAL ECONOMICS: EXPLAINING
ECONOMIC POLICY 172, 175 (2000); GENE M. GROSSMAN & ELHANAN HELPMAN, SPECIAL
INTEREST POLITICS 103-04 (2001). See Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson & James Robin-
son, Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth 4 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 10481, May 2004) (the de facto political power of an interest
group depends in part on its ability to solve its collective action problems but "we do not
yet have a satisfactory theory" of when groups are able to do so). But cf. GaryJ. Miller,
The Impact of Economics on Contemporary Political Science, 35 J. ECON. LIT. 1173, 1180-81
(1997) (highlighting significance of social incentives associated with group membership
as a determinant of individual political participation).
5OLSON, supra note 3.
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Enforcement presents a key difficulty: such a bargain cannot persist, and
consequently is unlikely to be struck, unless it can be enforced. Under
some circumstances, such an interest group bargain could be self-
enforcing. This possibility is emphasized in the stylized economic story
discussed in this part and formalized as a mathematical example in the
Appendix. But, as will also be discussed, the idea that competition policy
could reflect a political bargain is more general than the particulars of
the specific self-enforcement story discussed.
The political bargain story highlighted here views the regulatory policy
outcome of the political process as a contest between two large and
diffuse interest groups, producers and consumers. With an eye to history,
the "producer" category is understood as primarily composed of large
firms, with small firms joining consumers, farmers, workers, and others
whose lives were disrupted or threatened by the growth of large enter-
prise in what will be termed the "consumer" interest group.
In this story, the political system selects a regulatory regime from
among three options: competition (protected by antitrust enforcement),
market power, and price controls. 6 In a market power regime, cartels
would be permitted and the government would enact barriers protecting
incumbent firms against new competition. 7 In a price controls regime,
the government would keep prices low through regulation or legislation
with similar effect in redistributing surplus from producers to consum-
ers.8 The market power and price controls regimes can be understood
as special interest legislation by which either producers or consumers
exploit a legislative majority to appropriate rents from the other interest
group. By assumption, the competition regime permits the economy to
obtain efficiency gains unavailable under the market power or price
controls regimes.9
6 These possible regulatory regimes should be interpreted as ideal types. In practice,
each has a range of variants, as will become evident in the later discussion.
I Absent antitrust laws, market power would result in any given industry with probability,
not certainty, so the payoffs in a market power regime are understood as expected profits
that account for the possibility that private attempts to exercise market power might
fail. The government could improve the odds of success through policies favorable to
cartelization, such as government enforcement of private cartel agreements or the exclu-
sion of new competition at the behest of incumbents.
s For example, strongly consumer-oriented regulatory legislation might deconcentrate
major industries and simultaneously institute progressive corporate taxation.
9 By one estimate, the annual welfare benefits to the United States from adopting a
competition regime rather than permitting the unchecked exercise of market power could
readily exceed 1 percent of GDP, a figure far greater than the likely direct and indirect
social costs of antitrust. Jonathan B. Baker, The Case for Antitrust Enforcement, 17 J. EcoN.
PERSP., Fall 2003, at 27, 45.
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The most important economic assumption in the stylized story is that
a diffuse interest group, such as consumers or producers, can more easily
solve its collective action problems under conditions of adversity than
success. This plausible assumption is consistent with anecdotal evidence. 0
As a leading organizer of large and diffuse political interests explained,
"It's always easier to build a movement when the other side is in power.
When your own side is perceived to be in power, it's more difficult to
organize."11 Accordingly, if the favored regulatory policy of producers,
let us say, is adopted-namely a market power regime-then consumers
will find it easier to mobilize politically to overturn that policy.
This assumption is difficult to reconcile with forward-looking expecta-
tion formation by informed and rational actors. For such actors, the
existing policy regime would not matter in determining the stakes.
Rather, each interest group's valuation of a choice between, let us say,
a price controls regime and a market power regime would depend only
on future payoffs under the alternative regulatory regimes and would
not depend upon which regulatory regime is currently in effect. The
most promising approach for harmonizing the assumption that adversity
facilitates overcoming collective action problems with rational behavior
is to postulate greater costs of political mobilization among past winners
than among the losers.12 In any case, this assumption is consistent with
how collective action is understood in the behavioral and experimental
economic literatures.
1 3
10 On the plausibility of this assumption: it is hard to image a Ralph Nader successfully
mobilizing consumers politically by writing a book charging that automobiles are presently
safe products but soon would not be unless consumers organized, cf RALPH NADER, UNSAFE
AT ANY SPEED: THE DESIGNED-IN DANGERS OF THE AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE (1965), or a
Charles Murray successfully fostering a neoconservative reaction to the welfare state by
charging that government regulation had not yet produced adverse unintended conse-
quences but soon would. Cf CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POL-
icy, 1950-1980 (1984).
'1 Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Liberal Praise Drawn from Unlikely Source, WASH. POST, Oct. 18,
2004, at El, E12 (quoting Richard Viguerie, who has been termed "the funding father of
the conservative movement").
12 For example, the responsibility of governing that accrues to political winners may
raise the costs of organizing to fight the next political battle. Or, in a setting with multiple
interest groups divided over multiple issues, political mobilization around one issue could
be costly to the extent that it risks undermining a governing coalition by threatening the
prospects for political success for cross-cutting interest groups to which the members of
a large and diffuse interest group also belong.
13 For general surveys of these literatures, see Elinor Ostrom, Collective Action and the
Evolution of Social Norms, 14J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2000, at 137; Ernst Fehr & Simon
Gachter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity, 14J. ECON. PERSP., Summer
2000, at 159 (2000); John 0. Ledyard, Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research, in
HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 111 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds.,
1995). For a recent survey of factors affecting the ability of colluding firms to solve
2006]
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Three strands of these literatures are consistent with the view that
collective action problems among members of diffuse interest groups
are more easily solved under conditions of adversity than success. First,
surveys of experimental investigations of collective action conclude that
individual behavior is better characterized as adaptive and backward-
looking than strategic and forward-looking. 14 This characterization is
consistent with the idea that members of an interest group that have
succeeded in inducing the political system to adopt their favored policy
will tend to ignore the implications of increased lobbying by opponents
5
and will cooperate less than the members of an interest group seeking
to overturn that policy. Accordingly, diffuse interest group members will
act as though they perceive the stakes in regulatory policy making to be
less when the current policy regime is favorable, 6 even though the actual
stakes depend on the expected future regime rather than the current
regime. These interest group members will consequently have more
difficulty organizing collectively to respond to a gathering threat.
Second, in behavioral analyses of collective action, feelings of unfair-
ness and anger are found to support cooperation; 7 this perspective
collective action problems, see Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, What Determines
Cartel Success?, 44J. ECON. LIT. 43 (2006).
11 Frans van Winden, Experimental Investigation of Collective Action, in POLITICAL ECONOMY
AND PUBLIC FINANCE: THE ROLE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE THEORY AND PRACTICE
OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 178 (Stanley L. Winer & Hirofumi Shibata eds., 2002); Vjollca
Sadiraj, Jan Tuinstra & Frans van Winden, Interest Group Size Dynamics and Policymaking,
125 PUBLIC CHOICE 271 (2005).
1 That is, group members will tend to act myopically, as though the existing regulatory
regime will continue with certainty.
16 A high marginal per capita return from cooperation has a strongly positive effect on
contributions in the voluntary provision of public goods. Ledyard, supra note 13, at 149-51.
Cf ROGER G. NOLL & BRUCE M. OWEN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEREGULATION:
INTEREST GROUPS IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS 34, 41-42 (1983) (a group's ability to
overcome its collective action problems likely improves as the per capita stakes for its
members increase).
7 Jill Gabrielle Klein, N. Craig Smith & AndrewJohn, Why WeBoycott: ConsumerMotivations
for Boycott Participation, 68 J. MKTG. 92 (2004); AndrewJohn & Jill Klein, The Boycott Puzzle:
Consumer Motivations for Purchase Sacrifice, 49 MGMT. Scx. 1196 (2003); van Winden, supra
note 14; Paul M. Romer, Preferences, Promises and the Politics of Entitlement, in INDIVIDUAL
AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: CHILD CARE, EDUCATION, MEDICAL CARE, AND LONG-TERM
CARE IN AMERICA 195, 204-05 (Victor R. Fuchs ed., 1996); cf Simon Gachter & Arno
Riedl, Moral Property Rights in Bargaining with Infeasible Claims, 51 MGMT. Sci. 249 (2005)
(labor-management bargaining is influenced by subjective claims of unfairness). But cf
Roger G. Noll, Comment, in INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: CHILD CARE, EDUCA-
TION, MEDICAL CARE, AND LONG-TERM CARE IN AMERICA 221 (Victor R. Fuchs ed., 1996)
(commenting on Paul M. Romer's chapter Preferences, Promises, and the Politics of Entitlement)
(negative voting may best be understood as a way to prevent officials from shirking their
implicit commitments to interest groups rather than as a means by which cooperation
among interest group members is facilitated and, in any event, any negative voting theory
at best explains the behavior only of voters relatively uncommitted to a political party).
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recalls the historical sociology literature describing how a sense of injus-
tice helps diffuse groups solve collective action problems." These emo-
tions are more likely to be found among members of an interest group
that has lost recent major policy debates than among the winners, suggest-
ing that the losers will be better able to solve collective action problems.
Third, based on considerations like these, some behavioral economists
have come to model political participation among members of an interest
group as based in part on a reference or aspirational utility level, not
just actual utility and costs of participation. 9 This approach is consistent
with the view that individual political action (including action in the
presence of individual incentives to free ride) is determined importantly
by dissatisfaction with existing governmental policies-as is more likely
the case when an interest group has been unsuccessful in its past efforts
to influence government policy than when it has succeeded.
In order for a heightened sense of grievance to facilitate collective
action by a diffuse interest group, moreover, a diffuse interest group
that succeeds politically must be unable to lock-in its success permanently
by making it difficult for its unsuccessful rival interest group to mobilize
in the future. Many have observed a contrary dynamic in the wake of
political success by concentrated interest groups;20 the assumption made
here that adversity facilitates collective action takes the view that diffuse
interest groups are unable to behave similarly. This assumption is plausi-
ble because voters that are members of large and diffuse interest groups
would be expected to have multiple interest group allegiances, and have
difficulty negotiating complex cross-issue political compromises. 21 In con-
18 BARRINGTON MOORE, JR., INJUSTICE: THE SOCIAL BASES OF OBEDIENCE AND REVOLT
(1978).
19 See, e.g. Sadiraj et al., supra note 14; see Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard
Thaler, Fairness as a Constraint on Profit-Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON.
REV. 728 (1986) (firms gauge fairness in terms of reference transactions).
20 Concentrated interest groups that succeed in inducing the political system to adopt
their favored policy are sometimes able to compound their success by creating procedural
roadblocks to impede opposing interests from overturning that outcome in the future.
See, e.g., NOLL & OWEN, supra note 16, at 34, 39; Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic
Structure, in CAN THE GOVERNMENT GOVERN? 267 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson
eds., 1989) (analyzing methods currently advantaged groups employ to build agencies
that are difficult for opposing groups to gain control over later); cf. Forrest Maltzman &
Charles R. Shipan, Continuity and Change: The Evolution of the Law (Aug. 12, 2005),
available at http://www.uiowa.edu/-c030310/Research.html (analyzing factors affecting
durability of laws). As with regulatory capture theories generally, however, this dynamic
is more plausible with respect to single-industry regulation, in which the political contest
involves one or more concentrated interest groups, than with respect to economy-wide
regulation among diffuse producer and consumer interests.
21 Consistent with this perspective, the mathematical example set forth in the Appendix
treats the choice of regulatory policy as the only issue that the political system must resolve,
thereby ruling out the possibility of cross-issue bargaining in the interest group interaction.
2006]
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sequence, they may find themselves able to reach agreement only on a
narrow political program, such as the common denominator of their
shared interests. If alterations in procedural rules would affect differen-
tially the prospects of political success for the cross-cutting interest
groups to which the members of the large and diffuse interest group
also hold allegiance, such procedural modifications are unlikely to be
included in the political program of the diffuse interest group.
22
The political contest between producers and consumers over the
choice of regulatory regime analyzed here, thus, takes place under two
conditions: that these diffuse interest groups can more readily solve their
collective action problems under conditions of adversity than success,
and that a political success for one interest group does not go so far as
to create procedural hurdles that would make it difficult for a competing
interest group to organize. Under such circumstances, as the Appendix
shows with an example, the one-shot political interaction regarding econ-
omy-wide regulatory policy between producers and consumers would be
expected to lead to regulatory cycles.2 3 When consumers get the upper
hand, they institute price controls in order to extract rents from produc-
ers; when producers control the political system, they obtain the ability
to exercise market power. Political victories are temporary: the losing
group is motivated by adversity to mobilize its political resources more
effectively and overturn the undesirable regulatory regime. Hence, much
political debate would be expected to revolve around regulatory policy.
2 4
2 Cf Acemoglu et al., supra note 4 ("institutional changes that do not strengthen strong
opposition groups or destabilize the political situation are more likely to be adopted");
but cf JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, OFF CENTER: THE REPUBLICAN REVOLUTION
AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2005) (describing efforts of a diffuse national
governing coalition to discourage political mobilization by opponents).
21 Political cycles (and even more complex dynamics) similarly arise out of endogenous
variation in the propensity of individuals to participate in collective action in Sadiraj et
al., supra note 14. These authors relate the participation propensity to a reference utility
level, in order to implement an assumption similar to one made here, that dissatisfaction
with governmental policies is a determinant of political action. They do not, however,
consider the possibility that repeated play could support coordinated outcomes, the theme
emphasized here. Political cycles can also arise for other reasons. For example, it is well
known that outcomes resulting from majority voting can cycle because group preferences
may be intransitive even if individual voters have transitive preferences; this phenomenon
is known as a Condorcet cycle. See generally, KENNETH A. SHEPSLE & MARK S. BONCHECK,
ANALYZING POLITICS: RATIONALITY, BEHAVIOR, AND INSTITUTIONS (1997).
24 
Cycles between pro-producer and pro- consumer regimes sometimes appear in industry
regulation, as has occurred with the regulation of both cable television and natural gas.
See, e.g., Gregory S. Crawford, The Impact of the 1992 Cable Act on Household Demand and
Welfare, 31 RAND J. ECON. 422 (2000); M. ELIZABETH SANDERS, THE REGULATION OF
NATURAL GAS: POLICY AND POLITICS, 1938-1978 (1981). Unlike economy-wide regulatory
regimes, regulation in these industries does not involve bargaining between diffuse inter-
ests. Rather, the regulatory contest in these industries involves more than one concentrated
interest group with adverse interests: cable and broadcast in the case of cable television,
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In contrast, if producers and consumers come to recognize that they
interact politically in repeated play, another outcome is possible: a com-
petition policy bargain. As the example in the Appendix also shows, the
two diffuse interest groups can bargain to achieve a regulatory regime
in which antitrust enforcement ensures competition among firms. The
efficiency gains from competition would then be split between producers
and consumers.
If these groups are able to bargain politically to achieve competition,
moreover, that regime may be self-enforcing. Absent changes in the
discount rate or the payoffs, neither interest group would have an incen-
tive to encourage the political system to deviate from a competition
regime, as both would do better with competition than they would were
regulation to revert to cycles. Under such circumstances, economy-wide
regulation would no longer be found at the top of the political agenda
for either interest group.
A durable competition policy could result from interest group bargain-
ing even if the specific enforcement mechanisms suggested by the stylized
story do not apply in all particulars.25 For example, a competition policy
bargain between interest groups, once reached, could also be self-enforc-
ing for a reason that does not require the threat of reversion to regulatory
cycles: the diffuse distribution of economic and political power across
individual consumers, or across individual firms, may mean that neither
group could mobilize politically to undermine the bargain. Given the
"public good" nature of a political bargain to effectuate competition
policy, by which consumers and firms share the efficiency gains, no
individual firm or consumer may have sufficient incentive on its own to
bear the costs of shifting governmental policy toward a pro-producer or
pro-consumer regime, respectively.
and natural gas and oil in the case of natural gas regulation. Regulatory cycles may be
possible in these settings because the political power of the second concentrated interest
group can prevent the regulated industry from locking in temporary regulatory victories.
215 Even if the threat of reversion to regulatory cycles is an important mechanism for
enforcement of a competition policy bargain, moreover, other enforcement methods may
also matter because deviation from such a bargain may be easier than the stylized story
suggests. In particular, the example set forth in the Appendix ignores differences among
members of the consumer and producer groups (such as differences within the consumer
coalition between individual consumers, small firms, and farmers; possible differences in
discount rates between young and old consumers; and differences in the long-term pros-
pects of individual industries) that may exacerbate collective action problems in reaching
and enforcing an interest group bargain. In addition, the example treats the regulatory
policy decision as a choice among three discrete alternatives. The actual availability of a




Moreover, self-enforcement is not the only mechanism available to
enforce a competition policy bargain. Another possibility is that the
interest groups striking the bargain can take steps to insulate it by creating
institutions that would make competition policy difficult to undermine.
In particular, one could interpret a number of institutions as structural
impediments to the dismantling of U.S. competition policy. These
include the fabric of judicial cases elaborating antitrust rules in a legal
system that values consistency with precedent, the establishment of multi-
ple agencies with antitrust enforcement responsibility (particularly the
Justice Department's Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, but also state attorneys general), the well-developed norm by which
specific enforcement decisions by the federal antitrust agencies are pro-
tected from political influence, and the availability of private rights to
challenge antitrust violations in court. These institutions would not be
impervious to a legislative assault, were Congress of a mind to reduce
the scope of the antitrust laws, restrict access of certain potential plaintiffs
to the courts, and decrease the budget of the federal enforcement agen-
cies. Nor would they be impervious to ajudicial assault, were the Supreme
Court to choose to reinterpret precedents to undermine a competition
bargain, as some suggest was threatened during antitrust's Chicago
School revolution. Still, the inertia for competition policy undoubtedly
created by the presence of these institutions makes clear that a competi-
tion policy bargain could be enforced through a number of mechanisms,
and the plausibility of such a bargain is not tied to the specifics of the
self-enforcement mechanism emphasized above.
This interpretation of the development of competition policy in the
United States views the choice of regulatory regime, an economic institu-
tion, as the product of a political interaction among self-interested inter-
est groups. In this respect, it takes a similar perspective to the modern
economic literature on the endogenous development of economic insti-
tutions.2 6 The broader literature originally emphasized the hypothesis
that competition among alternative ways of organizing institutions would
tend to weed out those institutions that do not capture efficiencies, and
that as a consequence, institutional arrangements would tend toward
those that allow social groups to obtain efficiencies.2 7 But that provocative
26 See generally Acemoglu et al., supra note 4; cf Miller, supra note 4, at 1197 (surveying
examples of political institutions developed through negotiation by rational actors cogni-
zant of the distributional implications of institutional change).
27 This perspective was advocated in various forms in, for example, Armen A. Alchian,
Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory, 58J. POL. ECON. 211 (1950); Harold Demsetz,
Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967) (Papers and Proceedings);
Richard A. Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 281 (1979);
LANCE E. DAVIS & DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND AMERICAN ECONOMIC
GROWTH (1971); and Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for
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hypothesis foundered. For example, Douglass North "abandoned the
efficiency view of institutions" when he recognized that "[r] ulers devised
property rights in their own interests and transaction costs resulted in
typically inefficient property rights prevailing."28 One central difficulty
was identifying a mechanism, comparable to price, that would signal the
availability of efficiency gains to social actors and induce them to alter
institutions in order to achieve them. Accordingly, the modern literature
on the endogenous development of economic institutions has a different
emphasis: it highlights the likelihood that an inefficient outcome will
arise out of the political interaction, for example because political actors
have difficulty making commitments to compensate others in the future
or to take future actions that would not be in their interest ex post.29 Self-
enforcing agreements, such as the competition policy bargain discussed
here, are dismissed as generally implausible.
30
From this perspective, one contribution of this article is to rehabilitate
the possibility that interest group bargaining may lead to the develop-
ment of welfare-enhancing institutions. But unlike the earlier efficiency
view, this outcome is not regarded as the inevitable product of Coasian
bargaining among conflicting interest groups or evolutionary selection.
It is merely one possible outcome that may arise when coordination is
made possible by repeated interaction.
II. DID THE UNITED STATES STRIKE A POLITICAL BARGAIN
IN FAVOR OF COMPETITION POLICY?
The economic stylized story of how competition policy could emerge
politically through repeated interest group interaction, set forth above,
is consistent in broad outline with the historical evolution of antitrust
Political Influence, 98 Q.J. EcON. 371 (1983) [hereinafter Competition Among Pressure Groups];
Gary S. Becker, Public Policies, Pressure Groups, and Dead Weight Costs, 28 J. PUB. ECON. 329
(1985) [hereinafter Public Policies, Pressure Groups, and Dead Weight Costs].
28 
DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFOR-
MANCE 7 (1990). Similarly, Richard Posner is reportedly now "distinctly skeptical" about
the related claim that the common law tends toward rules that ensure economic efficiency.
Jfirgen G. Backhaus, Efficient Statute Law, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOM-
ICS AND THE LAW 24 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
2 See Acemoglu et al., supra note 4, at 37-47 (explaining how social conflict among
interest groups making conscious choices can cause underdevelopment).
30 See generally Daron Acemoglu, Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commit-
ment and Politics, 31 J. CoMP. ECON. 620 (2003). Acemoglu emphasizes the absence of an
impartial third party that can be relied upon to enforce political bargains and highlights
reasons why self-enforcing agreements (incentive-compatible promises) would not be
reached or would fall short of achieving the efficient outcome. But cf AVNER GREIF,
INSTITUTIONS AND THE PATH TO THE MODERN ECONOMY: LESSONS FROM MEDIEVAL TRADE
(2006) (studying self-enforcing institutions, by which rules conditioning the behavior of




in the United States.3 1 This consistency suggests that the story captures
an important aspect of that history. However, it does not explain every
nuance; the historical record is richer and more complex throughout
than the stylized story would presume.
The question of how to regulate big business was hotly debated for
decades during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, without clear
resolution, notwithstanding that the political branches enacted, interpre-
ted, and enforced the primary antitrust statutes during these decades.
3 2
Over this period, horizontal agreements, from loose pools to tighter
trusts, emerged in major industries, including railroads, steel, and sugar,
and large firms like American Tobacco and Standard Oil came to domi-
nate their markets.3  When regulation was adopted in response, it took
more than one form: public utility regulation for some industries, particu-
larly railroads and electric power, 4 and antitrust for others. But big
business had defenders, who argued that large scale enterprise was inevi-
table and beneficial to the economy.
35
Once enacted, the federal antitrust laws were enforced inconsistently.
Few cases were brought during the Sherman Act's first decade. In 1895,
the Supreme Court held that a government challenge to a combination
of manufacturing capacity in the sugar industry was beyond the reach
of federal commerce power and, consequently, beyond the reach of the
Sherman Act,s 6 though the Court liberalized its jurisdictional view a few
31 Modern antitrust enforcement arose first in the United States and, until the last
decades of the 20th century, was not central to regulatory policy in most other nations.
Cf Morton Keller, The Pluralist State: American Economic Regulation in Comparative Perspective,
1900-1930, in REGULATION IN PERSPECTIVE: HISTORICAL ESSAYS 56, 65 (Thomas K.
McCraw ed., 1981) ("Nowhere did large enterprise take root so readily or flourish so
luxuriantly as in the turn-of-the-century United States. And in no other country was there
so strong a political, legal, and regulatory response. The land of the trust was also the
land of antitrust."); TONY FREYER, REGULATING BIG BUSINESS: ANTITRUST IN GREAT BRIT-
AIN AND AMERICA, 1880-1990 (1992) (tracing the causes and consequences of differing
competition policies in the two nations). Moreover, the adoption of competition policy
elsewhere in the world undoubtedly owes much to the example and influence of the
United States. Accordingly, the stylized story of competition as a political bargain set forth
here is compared with the historical record in the United States only.
32 The statutory framework for federal competition policy in the United States was largely
settled by 1914. The Sherman Act was enacted in 1890. The Clayton Act and Federal
Trade Commission Acts were enacted in 1914.
33 See generally NAOMI R. LAMOREAUX, THE GREAT MERGER MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN
BUSINESS, 1895-1904 (1985).
34 See generally THOMAS K McCRAw, PROPHETS OF REGULATION (1984). Railroads were
also subject to the antitrust laws. E.g. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166
U.S. 290 (1897); United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898).
3SJames May, Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory in Constitutional
and Antitrust Analysis, 1880-1918, 50 OHIO STATE L.J. 257, 285 (1989).
'United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
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years later3 7 In 1899, the Court confirmed that naked price fixing violated
the Sherman Act,38 but shortly after that decision the colluding firms
were allowed to merge into a single firm without government challenge.
In 1904, the Supreme Court established that substantial horizontal merg-
ers violated the Sherman Act, 39 slowing the pace of industrial consolida-
tion. Standard Oil was broken up as a result of a high-profile Supreme
Court decision in 1911, but in doing so the Court set forth a then-
controversial framework for antitrust analysis which accepted that
restraints of trade by large firms, even when they led to market domi-
nance, could be found reasonable.
40
Two broad coalitions of diffuse interests contested economy-wide regu-
latory policy during the late 19th and early 20th centuries,4 1 each seeking
to appropriate the rents of the other (regardless of the costs of redistribu-
tion to aggregate social wealth).42 The Populist and Progressive accounts
of politics as a struggle between the people and the interests captures
an important aspect of debates over economy-wide regulatory policy
during that era.43 The introduction of competition policy can reasonably
17 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 175 U.S. 211 (1899). The Supreme Court
expanded its view of federal commerce clause power during the 1940s, after which E. C.
Knight was overruled. Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S.
210 (1948).
3 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 175 U.S. 211 (1899), aff'g 85 F. 271 (6th
Cir. 1898) (Taft, J.).
3" Northern Secs. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
40 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
41 Cf JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY 78 (1989) (when the costs and benefits of govern-
mental action are both widely distributed, as with the passage of the Sherman Act and
antitrust enforcement generally, "no one organizes" to seek the benefits or to avoid the
costs and the regulatory regime is said to have been produced by "majoritarian" politics);
SAMUEL P. HAYS, THE RESPONSE TO INDUSTRIALISM, 1885-1914 at 172 (2d ed. 1995) (at
the time the Sherman Act was passed by Congress, "antitrust agitation" was neither "well
organized" nor "particularly strong"). The political impetus for antitrust during the late
19th and early 20th centuries came importantly from politically mobilized farmers. ELIZA-
BETH SANDERS, ROOTS OF REFORM: FARMERS, WORKERS, AND THE AMERICAN STATE, 1977-
1917 (1999); DonaldJ. Boudreaux et al., Antitrust Before the Sherman Act, in THE CAUSES
AND CONSEQUENCES OF ANTITRUST: THE PUBLIC CHOICE PERSPECTIVE 255 (Fred S.
McChesney & William F. Shugart II eds., 1995).
42 Cf WILLIAM W. LEWIS, THE POWER OF PRODUCTIVITY: WEALTH, POVERTY, AND T14E
THREAT TO GLOBAL STABILITY (2004) (documenting higher productivity in the United
States relative to other nations; attributing that difference to greater product market
competition among firms in the United States; and attributing greater domestic U.S.
competition to the success of consumer interests in opposing producer and worker inter-
ests, in part, through antitrust enforcement).
43 See generally RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 234 (1955) (describing "a
widespread and urgent fear of business consolidation and private business authority");
ROBERT H. WEIBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877-1920 45, 52-53 (1967) (anti-monopoly
sentiment was the "most common means of expression" of a widespread "desire for
community self-determination" in the face of "threats to local autonomy" from "great
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be understood as the product of a political contest involving broad
coalitions of opposing interests.44 As historian Richard Hofstadter
explained, during the Progressive era, Americans "stopped viewing politi-
cal issues solely from the standpoint of the producer" and instead exhib-
ited "an equal concern with consumption as a sphere of life." 45 This
development of a "consumer consciousness," and the concomitant emer-
gence of consumers as an interest group, "gave mass appeal and political
force to many Progressive issues," including the desire to regulate
monopoly.
46
On the other hand, the asserted division of the polity into two broad
interest groups, here termed producers and consumers, downplays
important distinctions within these aggregates. 47 The terms "producer"
and "consumer" do not fully reflect the nature of the two political
coalitions that debated economy-wide regulatory policy. For example,
agrarian interests played a key role in the pro-antitrust "consumer" coali-
tion during political debates over antitrust legislation during the late
19th and early 20th centuries. 48 Similarly, the sweeping producer category
ignores the historically important distinction between small business and
big business. Small business interests were actually important members
corporations"; the Sherman Act seemed to "appear from nowhere" in order to reflect that
"consensus"); cf Mark T. Law & Gary D. Libecap, The Determinants of Progressive Era
Reform: The Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906 (Nov. 17, 2004), available at http://
entrepreneurship.eler.arizona.edu/docs/fac-pubs/Libecap-PureFoodDrugsAct.2004.pdf
(tracing the influence of producer and consumer groups in Progressive era food and
drug regulatory legislation). A rhetorical distinction between the people and corporate
interests was also employed by Franklin Roosevelt, in his attacks on "economic royalists,"
and continues to be adopted by some liberal politicians today.
44 Certain industries are subject to antitrust exemptions or special antitrust rules. These
include exemptions for labor unions, the business of insurance, and agricultural coopera-
tives. These exemptions and rules are generally the result of lobbying by concentrated
interest groups rather than diffuse interests, and for that reason are closer to industry-
specific regulation than to the economy-wide regulatory policy outcomes studied here.
Moreover, the success of antitrust has created concentrated interest groups with a stake
in preserving its institutions, including plaintiff and defense lawyers with antitrust practices,
consulting economists, and federal and state enforcement agencies. But these small interest
groups have little influence on economy-wide regulatory policy.
45 HOFSTADTER, supra note 43.
46
Id.
47 Cf James May, The Factional Foundations of Competition Policy in America 1888-1992, 42
ANTITRUST BULL. 239 (1997) (evaluating the claim that competition policy in the United
States is the product of an ongoing interaction between two factions, one committed to
protection from excessive private economic power and the other committed to protection
from excessive government regulation) (reviewing RUDOLPH J.R. PERITZ, COMPETITION
POLICY IN AMERICA 1888-1992: HISTORY, RHETORIC, LAw (1996)).
48 SANDERS, supra note 41, at 267-313.
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of the "consumer" political coalition seeking to regulate large firms
during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.49
Moreover, it can be difficult to categorize any individual or entity as
associated uniquely, or even primarily, with the producer or the con-
sumer category. Individual voters may be consumers at home, but they
may associate themselves with producer interests when worrying about
continued employment or the value of the stock holdings in their retire-
ment assets. Firms, which are not directly represented in the legislature
but are widely acknowledged to have political influence, may also be
difficult to categorize. They may be producers when transacting in their
output markets, but they are also consumers of inputs, including the
output of other firms. In addition, political debates over regulatory policy
took place in a range of settings, not just within the federal legislature
but also within the federal executive and judicial branches, and in the
states.50 Notwithstanding these qualifications, it appears reasonable to
treat the development of antitrust policy as the product of a political
interaction among two large and diffuse interests groups.
Through the early 20th century, political debates over regulatory policy
focused on the "monopoly problem" created by the rise of the large
corporation and its economic power generally, and the development
of industry-wide trusts in particular. 51 By 1912, historian Ellis Hawley
concludes, "three broad approaches to the 'monopoly problem' had
" Cf WEIBE, supra note 43, at 45-46 (during the late 1800s, local entrepreneurs particu-
larly resented large firms and feared that the great corporations were "stifling opportu-
nity"); ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY 447 (1966)
("the bulk of [Thurman] Arnold's support came not from any uprising of consumers,
but from smaller businessmen or dissatisfied business groups unable to compete success-
fully with their larger rivals..."); Samuel P. Hays, Political Choice in Regulatory Administration,
in REGULATION IN PERSPECTIVE, supra note 31, at 124, 136 (the "real world of continuous
antitrust politics" during the 1920s lay not in a battle between consumers and producers
but "within the business community between those who bought and those who sold").
Accordingly, antitrust law and policy have historically incorporated provisions favored
particularly by small sellers seeking to compete with large rivals, most notably statutory
prohibitions against price discrimination, exclusive dealing, and tying. In contrast, by the
start of the Chicago School revolution in antitrust, the small businessman had "all but
disappeared" as "a partner in the American liberal coalition," and "with him has gone
much of the pristine anti-bigness feeling of the Progressive tradition." Richard Hofstadter,
What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, in THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS,
AND OTHER ESSAYS 221 (1979 reprint). Today, regulatory policies aimed at protecting
small businesses are no longer reflexively regarded as in the interests of consumers.
50 On regulatory policy debates in the states, see generally STEVEN L. PIoTT, THE ANTI-
MONOPOLY PERSUASION: POPULAR RESISTANCE TO THE RISE OF BIG BUSINESS IN THE
MIDWEST (1985); May, supra note 35.
51 HAWLEY, supra note 49, at 4.
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emerged."52 Two of these, Woodrow Wilson's New Freedom and Theo-
dore Roosevelt's New Nationalism, can be understood as alternative ways
of taming concentrated economic power. Wilson's approach viewed large
firms as illegitimate and sought to restore competition-first, by eradicat-
ing special privileges benefitting the trusts and, second, by preventing
large firms from engaging in unfair competition. 53 Roosevelt rejected
deconcentration in favor of domesticating large firms through extensive
governmental supervision and planning.54 Both approaches sought to
benefit consumers, workers, farmers, and small business-the sectors of
society most concerned with the monopoly problem. When considered
in the context of contemporaneous political efforts to reduce tariffs
(viewed as taxing the general population for the benefit of private indus-
try) and to enact a progressive income tax, 5 both approaches can fairly
be considered variants of the pro-consumer price controls regime that
was set forth as an alternative in the stylized story of regulatory politics.
5 6
The third approach to the monopoly problem, more appealing to many
business leaders with large firm ties, sought to place business regulation
in the hands of self-governing trade associations. 57 This approach is
reasonably equated with the market power regulatory regime in the
stylized story.
This three-sided argument framed a hotly contested political debate
for the next three decades. The question of which regulatory approach
to follow took center stage during the presidential election of 1912.58
Although that election led to the creation of the Federal Trade Commis-
52 Id. at 9. Cf SANDERS, supra note 41, at 280-82 (describing three different positions
on antitrust policy that had "crystallized" by 1912, and their bases of political support).
The three approaches emphasized by Hawley did not exhaust the alternative regulatory
frameworks raised in the political debate, though they account for those most seriously
debated. Cf Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV.
1189, 1216-24 (1986) (describing regulatory reforms in 1914 as emerging out of complex
ideological and interest group activity). The other alternatives included relying on common
law tort and contract rules to regulate large business, and the socialist alternative of
governmental economic management and control.
13 HAWLEY, supra note 49, at 7.
54 Id.
55 See generally STEVEN R. WEISMAN, THE GREAT TAX WARS 237-88 (2002) (describing
political debates over taxes and tariffs during the 1912 presidential election campaign
and after the election of Woodrow Wilson).
56 The difference between these broad approaches had deep ideological roots, however,
making compromise among their partisans difficult. William E. Kovacic, The Federal Trade
Commission and Congressional Oversight of Antitrust Enforcement, 17 TULSA L.J. 587, 604-05
(1982).
11 HAWLEY, supra note 49, at 8-9.
5 8
JAMES CHACE, 1912: WILSON, ROOSEVELT, TAFT AND DEBS-THE ELECTION THAT
CHANGED THE COUNTRY 7-8 (2004); Kovacic, supra note 56, at 603-05.
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sion and the enactment of the Clayton Act, it did not resolve the funda-
mental issue. The role of large-scale enterprise and the appropriate form
of regulation remained contested, and at times the subject of bitter
policy debates, throughout the 1930s.5 9
Between 1912 and 1940, national regulatory policy was politicized,
and any apparent stability was only temporary. When times were good,
the reputation of business was at its peak, making business self-regulation
appealing and giving business forces the upper hand in political debates.
But hard times, particularly the onset of the Great Depression and the
1938 recession that interrupted the economic recovery, promoted anti-
business sentiment. While the Theodore Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson
administrations of the early 20th century had brought a number of
enforcement actions against trusts, 6° the Republican administrations of
the prosperous 1920s generally accepted interfirm cooperation as benign
industrial self-government and encouraged industries to form trade asso-
ciations. 61 Throughout this period, and especially during the economi-
cally challenging decade of the 1930s, direct regulation had become
routine in much of the economy, particularly in the transportation,
59 See generally HAWLEY, supra note 49. But see MARTIN SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECON-
STRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1980-1916, at 324-32 (1988) (concluding the
"corporate-liberal solution" had become established as "the national political consensus
on the regulation of the market" through the enactment of the Clayton and Federal Trade
Commission Acts in 1914).
60 Keller, supra note 31, at 68-69; see Richard A. Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust
Enforcement, 13 J.L. & EcON. 365, 366 (1970) (table showing that the rate at which the
Justice Department instituted antitrust cases rose beginning in 1905 or 1906, during the
T. Roosevelt administration). In response to expanded antitrust enforcement during the
early 20th century, "business leaders began to agitate for revision of the Sherman Act to
render it less threatening." SANDERS, supra note 41, at 276; but cf. SKLAR, supra note 59,
at 203 (all organized groups, not just large corporate capitalists, were dissatisfied with the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Sherman Act).
61 McCRAw, supra note 34, at 144-52; Ellis Hawley, Three Facets of Hooverian Associational-
ism: Lumber, Aviation, and Movies, 1921-1930, in REGULATION IN PERSPECTIVE, supra note
31, at 95; Kovacic, supra note 56, at 606-08; see generally Keller, supra note 31, at 75-91.
The Commerce Department, particularly when led by Herbert Hoover, took the lead in
promoting trade associations during the 1920s, to some extent at odds with the Justice
Department's concern that information exchange among rivals could lessen competition.
See American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921) (upholding
Justice Department challenge to information exchange among trade association members);
Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1924) (rejecting Justice Depart-
ment challenge to information exchange among trade association members). The Justice
Department instituted antitrust cases at nearly the rate of prior administrations through
the 1920s, though the rate declined at the FTC beginning during the middle of that
decade. See Posner, supra note 60, at 366, 369. The Justice Department's efforts to protect
the antitrust laws from being overrun by the rising tide in favor of business self-regulation
led the Supreme Court to reaffirm the core antitrust prohibition against price fixing and
reject the possibility of a defense based on the "reasonableness" of prices. United States
v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
2006]
ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL
financial services, electric power, and communications industries, includ-
ing a number of industry sectors not plausibly characterized as natural
monopolies.
62
All three regulatory visions of these decades-industry self-regulation,
national economic planning, and restoration of traditional competi-
tion-were pursued through the enactment of the regulatory center-
piece of the early New Deal, the National Industrial Recovery Act.63 The
Act, and the National Recovery Administration (NRA) it established,
offered the potential for national economic planning to the heirs of
Theodore Roosevelt, offered opposition to unfair competition to the
heirs of Woodrow Wilson, and offered the potential for industry self-
regulation to business groups weaned on the trade association emphasis
of the Republican administrations of the previous decade. In implemen-
tation, however, the NRA Codes of Fair Competition were rapidly cap-
tured by multiple concentrated industry groups, industry by industry,
under cover of the self-regulatory ideology promoted by big-business
interests. The NRA effectively gave industry license to cartelize, 64 contem-
poraneous with a Supreme Court decision adopting a lax attitude toward
price fixing among rivals.65 This outcome was at variance from popular
62 See generally MORTON KELLER, REGULATING A NEW ECONOMY: PUBLIC POLICY AND
ECONOMIC CHANGE IN AMERICA, 1900-1933 (1990). The political coalition originally
favoring direct regulation was likely dominated by those opposed to producer interests.
But see Roger G. Noll, Economic Perspectives on the Politics of Regulation, in II HANDBOOK OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1269-70 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989)
(noting alternative view that the Interstate Commerce Commission was created to help
improve enforcement of a railroad cartel). Notwithstanding its source of political support,
direct regulation has not invariably been pro-consumer in application, as agencies can
become "captured" by the regulated industry and so allow firms to appropriate rents
from consumers.
0 See generally HAWLEY, supra note 49; Rabin, supra note 52, at 1244-45; DONALD R.
BRAND, CORPORATISM AND THE RULE OF LAW: A STUDY OF THE NATIONAL RECOVERY
ADMINISTRATION (1988). The National Industrial Recovery Act was enacted in June 1933.
14 Firms in many industries exploited the opportunity to learn ways of coordination that
persisted for years after the National Industrial Recovery Act was declared unconstitutional.
Barbara Alexander, The Impact of the National Industrial Recovery Act on Cartel Formation and
Maintenance Costs, 76 REv. ECON. & STAT. 245 (1994);Jonathan B. Baker, Identifying Cartel
Policing Under Uncertainty: The U.S. Steel Industry, 1933-1939, 32 J.L. & EcON. S47 (1989);
A.M. McGahan, Cooperation in Prices and Capacities: Trade Associations in Brewing After Repeal,
J.L & ECON. 521 (1985); but cf. Barbara Alexander, Failed Cooperation in Heterogeneous
Industries Under the National Recovery Administration, 57 J. ECON. HIST. 322 (1997) (other
attempts at coordination were unsuccessful).
6 Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933). This decision, allowing
a crisis cartel among distressed coal producers, was effectively overruled in 1940. United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). The federal agencies responded
to the National Industrial Recovery Act and Appalachian Coals by "virtually halt[ing]"
antitrust enforcement activity. Kovacic, supra note 56, at 609-10.
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sentiment against big business during the Great Depression 66-so much
so that the agency might have been abolished had the Supreme Court not
declared the statute creating it unconstitutional in 1935.67 This unhappy
experience put both those favoring industrial self-regulation and the
advocates of taming the large corporation through governmental plan-
ning on the defensive. When the impetus to regulate big business became
more urgent with the recession of 1938,68 the stage was set for a political
resolution of the longstanding debate among regulatory visions.
Thurman Arnold, a former law professor appointed to lead the Justice
Department's Antitrust Division in 1938, took advantage of this political
space by reinvigorating government antitrust enforcement. 69 In a sense,
Arnold's program offered something to all sides. For those who wanted
to restore competition, Arnold expanded the government's antitrust
enforcement capability, used those new resources to attack large firms
in concentrated markets, andjustified doing so as removing "bottlenecks"
to competition. For those who favored national economic planning,
Arnold took on firms in one industry after another, seeking systematically
to identify and remove industry-specific bottlenecks with multiple
enforcement actions. For those who preferred industry self-regulation,
Arnold relied upon case-by-case enforcement, which forced the govern-
ment to prove a competitive problem to an independent judge, and he
emphasized the resolution of such cases by consent decree, which allowed
the industry to participate in the development of relief and so avoid costly
alterations to market structure. Taken as a whole, however, Arnold's
6 Once it became apparent during the code-writing process that "organized business
had emerged as the dominant economic group... criticism of thc NRA began to mount."
HAWLEY, supra note 49, at 477; see ROBERT H.JACKSON, THAT MAN: AN INSIDER'S PORTRAIT
OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 66 (2003) (By mid-1935, "it was doubtful if it was not fostering
monopoly," and those favoring restoration of traditional competition "had come to fear"
the NRA.)
67 HAWLEY, supra note 49, at 479. The National Industrial Recovery Act was held unconsti-
tutional on commerce clause and delegation doctrine grounds. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
61 In response to that renewed concern, a blue-ribbon panel, the Temporary National
Economic Commission (TNEC), was set up by Congress during 1938 to study the economy
and regulatory policy. The Commission held extensive hearings and issued its final report
during 1941. TNEC did not resolve the longstanding three-cornered debate over regulatory
policy, however. Its final report was "as timid as it was unoriginal." HAWLEY, supra note
49, at 465. That debate was resolved elsewhere in the political system.
6 Spencer Weber Waller, The Antitrust Legacy of Thurman Arnol, 78 ST. JOHN'S L. REv.
569 (2004); WYATT WELLS, ANTITRUST & THE FORMATION OF THE POSTWAR WORLD 82
(2002); Kovacic, supra note 56, at 610 (Arnold's appointment in 1938 "triggered an
unparalleled period of activity" at the Antitrust Division and commenced the "restoration
of antitrust as an important national policy"); see Hofstadter, supra note 49, at 194 (dating
a revival of antitrust, and its depoliticization, to 1937).
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approach, placing antitrust enforcement at center stage, added up to
something new: it gave close scrutiny to firm conduct in concentrated
markets without engaging in ongoing regulatory supervision or systemati-
cally sacrificing the efficiencies generated by large firms. In this way,
Arnold moved forward the political debate over regulatory policy, which
had for decades seemed incapable of resolution.
Arnold resigned in 1943 to accept an appointment as an appellate
judge, after the demands of war mobilization had circumscribed Execu-
tive Branch interest in antitrust enforcement. By then he had laid the
essential groundwork for a new approach to the problem of monopoly.
Over the decade of the 1940s, Arnold's use of antitrust law to regulate
large firm conduct was accepted by the other branches of government
and became the basis of national regulatory policy. The Supreme Court
unequivocally established the per se rule against horizontal price fixing
in 1940;70 the Sherman Act's concern with monopolization was reaffirmed
in litigation involving Alcoa in 1945;71 and Congress toughened the anti-
merger statute in 1950.72 With these events, antitrust's structural era-
in which legal doctrines and enforcement were reorganized around
hostility to market concentration-was underway. 73 To an important
extent, moreover, the antitrust enforcement norms established then-
particularly, the objection to horizontal price fixing and to mergers
leading to troublesome levels of market concentration-continue to
shape competition policy today.
74
70 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
71 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d. Cir. 1945). This decision
of a specially created panel of appellate judges is treated as having the same authority as
a Supreme Court decision.
72 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) (reviewing 1950 Celler-
Kefauver Act amendments to Clayton Act § 7). In the House debate, one proponent
defended the antitrust laws as a way of avoiding the unhappy choice between "control of
economic life by private monopoly and control of it by the state." 95 CONG. REC. 11,484,
11,494 (Aug. 15, 1949) (Rep. Sidney R. Yates); accord id. at 11,506 (Rep. Charles E.
Bennett). A leading Senate proponent described the antitrust laws as a bulkwark against
the establishment of "a Fascist state" or "a Socialist or Communist state," on the view that
those types of political organizations always result "where the public steps in to take over
when concentration and monopoly gain too much power." 96 CONG. REC. 16,433, 16,452
(Dec. 12, 1950) (Sen. Estes Kefauver); accord 96 CONG. REc. 16,498, 16,503-04 (Dec. 13,
1950) (Sen. George D. Aiken); 16,507 (Sen. Herbert R. O'Conor).
71 For a brief survey of antitrust's three historical eras-classical, structural, and Chicago
School-seeJonathan B. Baker, A Preface to Post-Chicago Antitrust, in POST CHICAGO DEVEL-
OPMENTS IN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 60-75 (Roger van den Bergh, Roberto Pardolesi &
Antonio Cucinotta eds., 2002).
4 See generally Kovacic, supra note 1; Leary, supra note 1. The major discontinuity in
antitrust doctrine and enforcement since the mid-20th century, antitrust's Chicago School
revolution of the late 1970s and 1980s, is addressed in Part III below.
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Since the mid-20th century, the political salience of regulatory policy
and the monopoly problem has receded. 75 Historian Richard Hofstadter
recognized this as early as 1964, when he wrote that the "antitrust move-
ment is one of the faded passions of American reform." 76 Another mea-
sure is the quadrennial platforms of the major political parties. Both
parties began endorsing antitrust enforcement in 1888, and generally
continued to do so for a full century, through 1988. 77 But the general
absence of antitrust planks in party platforms during the last several
presidential elections demonstrates that competition policy has become
less prominent over time in political debates.
78
The stylized story describing the emergence of a competition policy
bargain among competing interest groups matches this history in broad
outline. If the American polity reached a bargain in favor of competition
policy-not in the sense of enacting new statutes but by achieving a
long-lasting stability in economic regulatory policy-it did so during the
decade of the 1940s. 79 Regulatory policy was highly politicized before
75 Cf Eleanor Fox & Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust Policy, in CHANGING AMERICA: BLUEPRINTS
FOR THE NEW ADMINISTRATION 319, 322-23 (Mark Green ed., 1992) ("From the late 1930s
through 1980, American antitrust was a largely bipartisan program .... There were ups
and downs in enforcement levels and priorities during those decades, but antitrust was
accepted as sound and important policy.").
76 Hofstadter, supra note 49, at 188.
77 The Republican platform was less consistent than the Democratic platform. The
Republicans omitted mention of antitrust in 1932, and their 1980 platform singled out
for endorsement only the prevention of predatory pricing and gouging of captive custom-
ers. They did not mention antitrust in 1984, but in 1988 they highlighted the administra-
tion's record in criminal antitrust enforcement and called for fostering competition in
place of government monopolies. Provisions after that date sought modifications: the 1992
Republican platform called for modification of outdated antitrust rules said to impede
beneficial hospital mergers, and the 1996 platform endorsed modification of the antitrust
laws to allow health care providers to cooperate in holding down charges.
78 The continuing importance of disputes about the appropriate extent of tariffs and
other barriers to international trade is not inconsistent with the decreasing importance
of disputes about antitrust. Unlike arguments about domestic regulatory policy, the political
contests involving international trade are not entirely disputes between large and diffuse
interest groups of consumers and producers. The producer interests involved in any
political bargain over trade restraints-the specific industries seeking trade protection-
are often concentrated, while other producer interests-the foreign producers-are not
represented in the political process. Moreover, in this arena, consumers generally have
no practical option for appropriating producer rents; the pro-consumer and the aggregate
welfare-maximizing policies are likely similar.
79 Cf WELLS, supra note 69, at 82 ("After 1945, compliance with the antitrust statutes
became for the first time a regular concern of most large companies."). By one view, the
seeds of this bargain were planted by the Supreme Court's adoption of a rule of reason
standard in 1911, coupled with the 1914 enactment of the Federal Trade Commission
Act. Together, though "not without about fifteen years of protracted, sharp, and bitter
political conflict," these developments settled the trust question in the polity, by reaching
"a nonstatist accommodation of the law to the corporate reorganization of capitalism,"
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that time, and has become much less so since."0 But while the story
reasonably captures some of the history, it misses at least six other aspects.
First, there were arguably two diffuse and opposing interest groups with
a stake in regulatory policy, for example, but political debates during
the early 20th century coalesced around three, not two, positions. This
split makes clear that ideas play an independent role in aggregating
interests, promoting collective action, and shaping political programs in
ways not accounted for in the stylized story's focus on interests.8' Second,
while there was no political consensus on regulatory policy before the
mid-20th century, policy did not explicitly cycle between pro-consumer
and pro-producer outcomes; instability would be a better character-
ization.
Third, the ability of the competing interest groups to overcome collec-
tive action problems varied with more than the nature of the current
policy regime. Adversity appeared to facilitate political success for con-
sumer interests, but in an indirect manner, requiring both experience
with an adverse regulatory regime and hard times generally. Thus, indus-
try self-regulation with minimal governmental involvement, the program
of big business, was the most discredited during business cycle downturns
(during the early 1930s, when the NIRA was enacted and subsequently
abandoned, and during the latter part of the same decade, when the
Temporary National Economic Committee was created and Thurman
Arnold launched his enforcement effort) and most successful during
periods of prosperity (the 1920s).
thereby explaining why the trust question quickly "receded from the center of national
politics." SKLAR, supra note 59, at 167, 173.
10 The decline in political salience of regulatory policy since the 1940s might be attributed
not just to a political bargain in favor of competition policy but also in part to post-World
War II prosperity (in parallel with the way that anti-business sentiment, and calls for
regulation, receded during periods of relative prosperity during earlier decades). This
theory has the virtue of connecting the major interruption in that loss of salience-the
Chicago School revolution in antitrust of the late 1970s and 1980s, along with the broader
deregulation movement of the 1980s-to the major interruption in the long prosperity,
the stagflation of the 1970s. It ignores, however, the likelihood that prosperity derives, in
part, from the ability of the economy to obtain static and dynamic efficiency benefits from
competition, through antitrust enforcement. See generally Baker, supra note 9. Another
possibility is that United States acceptance of antitrust was the product of the Cold War
political competition between the United States and the U.S.S.R., and that the political
salience of regulatory policy in the United States faded as the competing economic system
lost legitimacy. But antitrust was becoming less important in U.S. political life long before
the late 1980s overthrow of state socialism in Eastern Europe and Russia.
81 For a discussion of the role of ideas in mediating the competition among interests
during debates about regulatory policy around the turn of the 20th century, see generally
SKLAR, supra note 59, at 166-73 (discussing the evolution of federal law on restraint of
trade from 1890 to 1920). The complex relationship between economic ideas and legal




Fourth, the shifting fortunes of the consumer and producer interest
group coalitions during the early 20th century cannot be traced directly
to shifts in interest group mobilization, as the stylized story supposes.
Rather, changes in the political climate affected the decisions of political
leaders, whose fortunes were tied to their ability to garner votes in the
future. This dynamic can, however, be interpreted as interest group
mobilization of a sort: as decision making based upon forecasts by politi-
cians as to the likely attitudes of voters and their incentives to participate
in the next election. Fifth, the acceptance of Thurman Arnold's antitrust
enforcement program by the political system was not tied rhetorically
to a recognition that an intermediate antitrust policy could generate
efficiency gains that could be shared among interest groups, as the
stylized story arguably suggests, but that program did find a way to
give something valuable to the advocates of each of the three leading
regulatory visions. Finally, the political bargain, if it indeed was one, was
not purely a matter of legislative enactment; it took the form of a broad
consensus that had developed among the three branches of government.
Notwithstanding these qualifications, it is reasonable to conclude that
the stylized political bargain story captures an important dynamic in the
historical acceptance of competition policy in the United States.
III. INTERPRETING THE RISE OF THE CHICAGO SCHOOL
The dramatic shift in antitrust doctrine and enforcement policy during
the late 1970s and 1980s poses a challenge to the claim that the United
States adopted a political bargain in favor of efficiency-enhancing compe-
tition policy. Antitrust's Chicago School revolution might seem to belie
the claim of substantial continuity in the political acceptance of antitrust
policy since the 1940s, and so call into question the relevance of the
political bargain perspective to understanding U.S. antitrust history.
During the late 1970s and 1980s many, if not most, antitrust doc-
trines-including the rules governing vertical intrabrand restraints, pred-
atory pricing, and horizontal agreements-were reconstructed around
an economic approach heavily influenced by the ideas of lawyers and
economists associated with the University of Chicago (including Robert
Bork, Aaron Director, Frank Easterbrook, Richard Posner, and George
Stigler).82 If these developments are understood as a successful effort by
producers to obtain market power that did not trigger a countervailing
82 For a brief survey of the doctrinal shifts, see Baker, supra note 73, at 65-67. The
intellectual roots of the Chicago School approach to antitrust, with an emphasis on a
1956 article published by Aaron Director and Edward Levi, are explored in James May,
Redirecting the Future: Law and the Future and the Seeds of Change in Modern Antitrust Law, 17
MIss. COLL. L. REv. 43 (1996).
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political effort by consumers to regulate business-that is, if they are
understood as producer interests reneging on a political bargain in favor
of competition policy-then this dramatic shift in antitrust doctrine
would be inconsistent with the view that producer and consumer interests
had by mid-century reached a stable long-term political bargain to adopt
competition as the nation's regulatory regime.
8 s
Certain aspects of the transition from antitrust's structural era to its
Chicago School era arguably suggest a radical non-enforcement agenda
and consequently might be thought to show that the Chicago School
revolution is inconsistent with the view of antitrust as a political bargain.
These features were particularly noticeable at the Antitrust Division of
the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission during the
second term of the Reagan administration. Budgets at the federal anti-
trust agencies declined substantially during the 1980s, and staffing fell by
nearly half.8 4 Measured by case initiations, the federal agencies exhibited
markedly less interest in attacking exclusionary conduct, whether involv-
ing vertical agreements, vertical mergers, or monopolization, and they
reduced the rate of merger enforcement generally.8 5 These striking
11 Anecdotal evidence suggests that producer interests generally supported the doctrinal
changes associated with the rise of the Chicago School, while consumer groups often
opposed them. This kind of evidence does not distinguish between the possibility that
producers induced the legislature to end a political bargain in favor of competition
policy and the possibility that producer interests induced reform of the antitrust laws (by
highlighting evidence that structural era doctrines were operating to hamstring producers)
without reneging on the fundamental competition policy bargain. Accordingly, interest
group views on the Chicago School revolution are not systematically evaluated here.
84 From 1980 to 1989, FTC staffing fell from 1719 to 894 full-time equivalents. (Statistics
available at http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/oed/fmo/fte2.htm). The staffing reduction was likely
split evenly between the agency's competition and consumer protection missions. See
Kirkpatrick Committee Report, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 43, 139 (1989) (Graph 2, reporting FTC
employment by mission from 1981 through 1988). Authorized positions at the Antitrust
Division of the Justice Department declined from 939 in 1980 to 549 in 1989, while the
number of attorneys on-board fell from 409 to 237. REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW TASK FORCE ON THE ANTITRUST DIVISION OF
THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE A3 (1989). During the same years, both FTC and
Antitrust Division appropriations held constant in nominal dollars and, thus, declined by
about 31 percent in real terms (adjusted for inflation using the GDP deflator). (Appropria-
tions statistics are available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/10804a.htm and http://
www.ftc.gov/ftc/oed/fmo/appropriationhistory.htm).
85 Fox & Pitofsky, supra note 75, at 324-25 (tables showing declining rates of Justice
Department investigation and case filing between 1979 and 1991). Federal enforcers during
the Reagan administration as a whole initiated vertical restraints cases at an unusually low
rate relative to their predecessors and successors. Kovacic, supra note 1, at 460, 462.
Monopolization cases were rarely initiated throughout the Reagan and first Bush adminis-
trations. See id. at 449 & n.246. Vertical merger enforcement increased noticeably after
the end of the Reagan administration. See Leary, supra note 1, at 120, 128-30. The rate
of merger challenges (horizontal and vertical combined) was substantially lower during
the second term of the Reagan administration than during any other presidential term
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declines in enforcement agency activity were part of a broad social
and political reaction during the 1970s to the expansion in the role of
government that had taken place during the previous half-century, from
the New Deal to the Great Society; it is no accident that they occurred
at the same time that deregulation and neoconservatism became famil-
iar words.1
6
Moreover, the Reagan administration proposed wide-ranging new anti-
trust legislation to Congress.87 The legislative package could be read as
seeking to circumscribe the scope of various antitrust doctrines and
remedies. Among other things, the proposals would have exempted from
antitrust review mergers in distressed domestic industries harmed by
increased imports; 8 reduced private damages recovery for lost profits
between 1982 and 2000. Id. at 139. Moreover, during the mid-1980s, when the Department
of Transportation was charged with the review of airline mergers, it allowed two large
acquisitions involving carriers with overlapping route networks to proceed notwithstanding
Justice Department opposition.
86 Fluctuations in enforcement activity during the transition between the structural era
and the Chicago School era were dominated by the effects of that transition. Vivek Ghosal,
Regime Shifts in Antitrust Law (Georgia Inst. of Technology School of Econ. Working
Paper, October 2004), available at http://www.encore.nl/documents/RegimeShiftsinAnti
trustGhosalOOl.pdf (mid-to-late 1970s regime shift associated with the Chicago School
revolution in antitrust dominates time series data on case filings). Empirical studies of
antitrust enforcement activity over that period generally attribute variation in activity more
to political factors than economic ones, consistent with the view that the Chicago School
revolution was part of a broad, once-in-a-generation shift in social thought and values.
E.g. Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control?
Regulatory Policymaking by theFederal Trade Commission, 91J. POL. ECON. 765 (1983) (explain-
ing a major shift in both antitrust and consumer protection enforcement at the FTC
around the late 1970s in terms of a change in the composition of congressional oversight
committees) (confirming the qualitative thesis set forth in Kovacic, supra note 56, at 653);
B. Dan Wood & James E. Anderson, The Politics of U.S. Antitrust Regulation, 37 AM. J. POL.
Sci. 1 (1993) (rejecting economic and bureaucratic explanations for the abrupt shift in
Justice Department antitrust enforcement inputs and outputs between 1970 and 1989 in
favor of a political explanation); Vivek Ghosal & Joseph Gallo, The Cyclical Behavior of the
Department of Justice's Antitrust Enforcement Activity, 19 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 27 (2001)
(rejecting private interest group explanation of antitrust enforcement between 1955 and
1994 because, contrary to that theory's prediction, enforcement increased during business
cycle downturns); John E. Kwoka, Jr., Commitment to Competition: An Assessment of Antitrust
Agency Budgets Since 1970, 14 REV. INDUS. ORG. 295 (1999) (concluding that antitrust
enforcement agency budgets between 1970 and 1997 were affected by the scope of
economy-wide regulation, the political party in control of Congress and the Executive
Branch, and overall economic activity).
87 These legislative proposals, along with transmittal letters from the Attorney General
and Secretary of Commerce, are reprinted in 50 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 347
(Special Supp. Feb. 20, 1986). They were endorsed by "leaders of the private antitrust
bar." Lloyd Constantine, The Importance of State Antitrust Enforcement 3 (June 22,
2004), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/recent2/360.pdf.
91 A distressed industry permitted to use this exemption would not have been able to
restrain import competition, however.
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(as would apply in cases brought by terminated dealers or excluded
rivals) to single damages;89 and modified the merger review standard in
ways that would have effectively converted it to an unstructured rule of
reason review. 90 The Department of Justice also proposed, through an
amicus brief, that the Supreme Court overturn the longstanding rule of
per se illegality against resale price maintenance (vertical price fixing).91
During the transition to antitrust's Chicago School era, the rhetoric
of federal enforcement officials often emphasized the benefits of not-
intervening, especially during the second term of the Reagan administra-
tion,92 and they were criticized for inaction. 93 Commentators associated
with the Chicago School approach recommended that the courts toss
out entire categories of prior prohibitions, especially in the area of
vertical restraints, 94 and some commentators called for scrapping the
antitrust laws entirely.
95
89This proposal also gave something to antitrust plaintiffs: under it, actual damages
could be increased to include prejudgment interest.
90 Specifically, the proposals would have replaced the incipiency language and lessening
of competition test of the existing merger law with a requirement that a court find "a
significant probability" that the merger "will substantially increase the ability to exercise
market power." Courts would also have been required to consider "all economic factors"
relevant to determining the effect of the merger, including market concentration, entry
and expansion by rivals, the nature of the product and terms of sale, conduct of firms in
the market, and efficiencies.
91 See Monsanto v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 n.7 (1984) (declining to
reconsider the per se rule against resale price maintenance, although urged to do so by
the Solicitor General).
92 See, e.g., 60 Minutes with Douglas H. Ginsburg, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division,
55 ANTITRUST L.J. 255, 256-59 (benefits of mergers), 263 (problems with attacking non-
price predation), 266 (resale price maintenance investigations are unlikely to yield cases)
(1986); cf 60 Minutes with Daniel Oliver, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, 56 ANTITRUST
L.J. 239, 239-40 (1987) (principal source of restrictions on competition is government).
93 Fox & Pitofsky, supra note 75.
11 See, e.g. Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution:
Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 6 (1981); cf Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust,
65 TEX. L. Ruv. 1, 19-23 (1984) (advocating inquiry into defendant(s) market power as
initial screen, and suggesting that absence of such power would provide a basis for dismiss-
ing antitrust cases without further inquiry).
11 See, e.g., D.T. ARMENTANO, ANTITRUST POLICY: THE CASE FOR REPEAL (1986); William
F. Shugart II, Don't Revise the Clayton Act, Scrap It!, 6 CATOJ. 925 (1987). Antitrust skeptics
most commonly argue that market power is transient and self-correcting (unless protected
by government action), while government intervention to protect competition, however
well-intentioned, is often ineffectual or counterproductive. See, e.g. LESTER C. THUROW,
THE ZERO-SUM SOCIETY: DISTRIBUTION AND THE POSSIBILITIES FOR ECONOMIC CHANGE
127, 145-50 (1980); Fred L. Smith, Jr., The Case for Reforming the Antitrust Regulations (If
Repeal Is Not an Option), 23 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 23 (1999-2000); Clyde Wayne Crews,
Jr., The Antitrust Terrible 10: Why the Most Reviled "Anti-Competitive" Business Practices Can
Benefit Consumers in the New Economy, Cato Policy Analysis No. 405, at 16 (June 18, 2001)
(describing antitrust as "just another form of inefficient economic regulation"). Other
antitrust skeptics advocate displacing competition policy in favor of broader industrial
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These efforts at antitrust reform never added up to replacing a competi-
tion regime with a regulatory regime systematically allowing the exercise
of market power, however. One reason is that Congress balked: The
Justice Department's controversial legislative proposals were not enacted,
and Congress prevented the Justice Department from pursuing in oral
argument at the Supreme Court its amicus efforts to relax the prohibition
against resale price maintenance. 96 After the Reagan administration,
moreover, federal enforcement agency budgets and staffing increased 97
and the longstanding norm protecting individual enforcement decisions
from political influence was not undermined.
The states balked as well. During the Reagan administration, they
formed a national task force to coordinate their individual efforts9" and
issued enforcement guidelines setting out a more interventionist policy
than the federal agencies had adopted with respect to vertical agree-
ments and horizontal mergers. 99 The states then became more active in
antitrust enforcement, 1°° emphasizing areas that the federal agencies
planning. Stuart E. Eizenstat, Reindustrialization Through Government-Business-Labor Alliance,
53 ANTITRUST L.J. 105 (1984) (recounting views of senior trade officials during the Reagan
administration, and advocating the inclusion of antitrust policy within a coordinated
industrial policy process).
96 After the United States had filed an amicus brief urging that the Supreme Court
overrule the per se prohibition against resale price maintenance, Congress prohibited the
expenditure of funds by the Antitrust Division to pursue that position in oral argument.
See Monsanto v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 n.7 (1984) (Solicitor General's
position taken "by brief only"). Congress enacted a joint resolution in 1985 calling on
the attorney general to withdraw the Antitrust Division's then-new Vertical Restraints
Guidelines. 1985 H.R. 2965 (P.L. 99-180). The House and Senate also both passed bills
that would have reaffirmed the related rule preventing manufacturers from cutting off
discounting dealers byagreementwith full-service dealers, but legislation was never enacted
because of a dispute over whether to exempt firms lacking market power. See House Defeats
Conference Report on Resale Price Maintenance Measure, 63 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
3 (July 2, 1992).
17 FTC statistics are available at http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/oed/fmo/fte2.htm and http://
www.ftc.gov/ftc/oed/fmo/appropriationhistory.htm; Antitrust Division appropriation sta-
tistics are available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/10804a.htm.
9s The Multistate Antitrust Task Force of the National Association of Attorneys General
was formed in 1983. See David W. Lamb, Avoiding Impotence: Rethinking the Standards for
Applying State Antitrust Laws to Interstate Commerce, 54 VAND. L. REv. 1705, 1715 (2001). At
the start of the second term of the Reagan administration, in March 1985, the states
"decided to enter the national enforcement market" and become "de facto a third national
antitrust agency." Lloyd Constantine, The Mission and Agenda for State Antitrust Enforcement,
36 ANTITRUST BULL. 835, 840 (1991). See also Constantine, supra note 87.
9 National Association of Attorneys General, Vertical Restraint Guidelines, reprinted in
49 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 996 (Dec. 5, 1985) (issued Dec. 4, 1985). These
Guidelines were revised in 1988 and 1995. National Association of Attorneys General,
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, reprinted in 52 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) Spec.
Supp. (Mar. 12, 1987) (issued Mar. 10, 1987). These Guidelines were revised in 1993.
100 The new antitrust activism of state attorneys general was criticized at that time by
the Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission. 60 Minutes with Daniel Oliver, Chairman,
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chose not to pursue. 10 1 In recognition of the more activist role of the
states, Section of Antitrust Law of the American Bar Association began
in 1990 routinely inviting a leader of the state task force to join its
annual enforcement roundtable, traditionally presented by the Assistant
Attorney General for Antitrust and the Chairman of the Federal
Trade Commission.
Withjudicial acceptance of Chicago School views, the regulatory land-
scape changed dramatically but not fundamentally. Antitrust hostility to
cartels has not decreased; the merger waves of the late 1970s and late
1990s were not the product of doctrinal changes in antitrust and did
not concentrate markets in a manner reminiscent of the merger wave
around 1900; and there is no reason to think that market power is being
exercised more today than during the 1950s and 1960s. Accordingly, if
the U.S. political system is understood as having adopted an interest
group bargain in favor of competition policy during the 1940s, it is
difficult to describe these events four decades later as discarding competi-
tion in favor of a regulatory regime that did not police the exercise of
market power. 0
Much of the Chicago School revolution aimed at reform of the anti-
trust laws rather than repeal.103 The central economic critique of struc-
Federal Trade Commission, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 239, 245-47 (1987); 60 Minutes with Daniel
Oliver, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 235, 242-43 (1987) (describ-
ing state enforcers as a "group of antitrust counter-revolutionaries").
101 During the late 1980s, various states attacked resale price maintenance by Minolta
and Panasonic; those cases were resolved by settlement. See 50 Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA) 372 (Feb. 27, 1986) (Minolta case filed); 53 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) 56 (July 9, 1987) (Minolta case settled); 56 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
89 (Jan. 19, 1989) (Panasonic case filed); 56 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 428
(Mar. 16, 1989) (Panasonic case settled). The states challenged a debit card joint venture
by Master Card and Visa, and settled the case with an agreement that terminated the
venture. 57 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 156 (Aug. 3, 1989) (case filed); 58 Antitrust
& Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 709 (May 10, 1990) (case settled). States also brought and later
settled a complaint against a number of insurance companies, charging group boycotts
that resulted in anticompetitive restrictions on the scope and availability of insurance
coverage to municipalities. 54 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 499 (Mar. 24, 1988)
(case filed); 67 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 434 (Oct. 13, 1994). Federal antitrust
enforcers did not join in any of these cases. During this period, the states saw themselves
as the primary governmental enforcers of vertical restraints law. Robert Abrams & Lloyd
Constantine, Dual Antitrust Enforcement in the 1990s, in REVITALIZING ANTITRUST IN ITS
SECOND CENTURY 484, 488 (Harry First, Eleanor M. Fox & Robert Pitofsky eds., 1991)
("In areas such as price and nonprice vertical restraints, the states are the only governmental
keepers of the flame.").
102 The Chicago School revolution in antitrust likely reallocated some of the benefits of
the political bargain from consumers to producers. This redistributional effect undoubtedly
was welcomed by producer interests, and may have been encouraged by them. But some
redistribution of the benefits could occur without undermining the political bargain.
10
3 To "identify" successful coordination (as that term is used by empirical economists)
among interest groups, one might ask whether, after the time the competition policy
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tural era antitrust was that those earlier doctrines, in their single-minded
focus on preventing the harms that could arise from market concentra-
tion, systematically deterred procompetitive practices. But the lawyers
and economists who provided the intellectual support for doctrinal adap-
tation, the federal enforcers who encouraged that trend, and the courts
have consistently and strongly expressed concern about horizontal collu-
sion. Consequently, they have defended an aggressive role for antitrust
enforcement in challenging naked horizontal price fixing and market
division, and mergers among rivals creating high concentration. 1 4 Argu-
ments about the social costs of structural era antitrust rules gained
plausibility in part because they appeared during an economy-wide pro-
ductivity slowdown, 105 and because the courts adopted Chicago School
views about antitrust during an era of more general bipartisan regula-
tory reform. 0 6
To a substantial extent, moreover, the shift in antitrust doctrine that
took place during the late 1970s and 1980s appears to reflect a bipartisan
bargain is said to have been reached, antitrust law and enforcement took advantage of
opportunities to reform doctrinal rules and enforcement approaches, as they arose, in
order to increase the gains to aggregate welfare. Cf Timothy F. Bresnahan, The Oligopoly
Solution Is Identified, 10 EcON. LETrERS 87 (1982) (analogous method of identifying coordi-
nation among firms playing a repeated prisoners' dilemma). If the Chicago School revolu-
tion is understood as an episode of reform rather than repeal, the answer is surely yes.
Antitrust has arguably institutionalized a method of ongoing reform based on incorporat-
ing developments in economic theory and empirical economic methodologies for case
targeting and evaluation. These developments are incorporated most importantly through
the work of economists at the antitrust enforcement agencies and expert witnesses in
court proceedings. SeeJonathan B. Baker, "Continuous"Regulatory Reform at the Federal Trade
Commission, 49 ADMIN. L. REv. 859 (1997) (agency use of economics); cf Baker, supra
note 73, at 68-70 (describing complex relationship between economic developments and
legal change in antitrust). As a result, recent antitrust enforcement exhibits a growing
hospitality to econometric evidence and to post-Chicago developments in economic think-
ing, most notably game theoretic approaches. SeeJonathan B. Baker & Daniel L. Rubinfeld,
Empirical Methods in Antitrust Litigation: Review and Critique, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 386
(1999) (use of econometrics).
101 See. e.g. ROBERT H. BORE, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 221 (1978) (horizontal mergers);
id. at 263 (cartels); 60 Minutes With Charles F Rule, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 261 (1987) (highlighting criminal price fixing and horizontal
merger enforcement).
105 MARTIN NEIL BAILY & ALOK K. CHAKRABARTI, INNOVATION AND THE PRODUCTIVITY
CRISIS (1988).
106 Part of the regulatory reform movement involved the dismantling of rate regulation
schemes in transportation, financial services, energy, and communications. Clifford Win-
ston, Economic Deregulation: Days of Reckoning for Microeconomists, 31 J. EcON. LIT. 1263
(1993). These reforms generally replaced price controls with antitrust enforcement; they
did not free deregulated industries from both price controls and antitrust. For example,
the 1996 law deregulating telecommunications included rules aimed to assure a transition
to a competitive market. With airline deregulation, the authority to challenge mergers
was originally given to the Department of Transportation, which allowed some large
mergers over the opposition of the Justice Department. After those events, Congress
shifted merger review to Justice.
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consensus, 0 7 consistent with the view that they represent efficiency-
enhancing reforms. 08 Post-Chicago economic developments generally
tend to point antitrust in a more interventionist direction, but without
suggesting that the doctrinal changes of the 1970s and 1980s should
be overturned in favor of a return to antitrust's structural era.' 9 Any
suggestion today that the antitrust laws do more harm than good and so
should be repealed entirely remains outside the mainstream consensus,"
0
107 See generally Kovacic, supra note 1, at 460, 462. Partisan divisions with respect to
antitrust have not disappeared entirely in the Chicago School era, however, particularly
with respect to allegations of anticompetitive exclusion (which most commonly arise in
the review of vertical practices, group boycotts, and monopolization claims). The number
of federal monopolization cases initiated during the eight years covering the most recent
Democratic administration was nearly triple the number brought during the twelve years
covering the two Republican administrations that preceded it, for example. Id. at 449.
Federal enforcers during the Clinton administration also filed vertical restraints cases,
which often involved an exclusion theory, at more than double the rate as did their
predecessors in Reagan and first Bush administrations. Id. at 460. The Clinton administra-
tion cases included high-profile actions against American Airlines, Intel, Microsoft, and
Mylan. Notwithstanding these partisan differences over the appropriate scope of enforce-
ment against anticompetitive exclusion in practice, there is little partisan dispute over the
principle that exclusion can harm competition and that if that can be proved, and a
suitable remedy devised, antitrust enforcement is properly undertaken. The Antitrust
Division during the second Bush administration, which takes a distinctly less interventionist
view of exclusion than its Clinton administration predecessor, chose to purse the American
Airlines predatory pricing case on appeal. See United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F. 3d 1109
(10th Cir. 2003). Similarly, the district court's finding of liability in Microsoft was affirmed
unanimously by the D.C. Circuit sitting en banc. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253
F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). These appellate judges included Douglas Ginsburg, a conservative
antitrust expert who headed the Antitrust Division during the second term of the Reagan
administration, the least-interventionist period for federal enforcement in modern antitrust
history. Robert Bork, one of the leading commentators associated with the rise of the
Chicago School, has long endorsed the Supreme Court's prohibition of unjustified exclu-
sionary conduct by a monopolist in Lorain Journal BORK, supra note 104, at 344-46
(discussing Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951)). Bork cited that
decision as the basis for his support for the monopolization suit against Microsoft. Robert
H. Bork, The Case Against Microsoft (1998), available at http://www.procompetition.org/
research/bork.html.
108 Producers and consumers would be expected to share efficiency gains available
through regulatory reform, limiting the extent of partisan debate as to those reforms
relative to the debate over policies that would benefit one group at the expense of another.
109 Post-Chicago criticisms of current antitrust doctrine largely accept the economic
approach, and call for modifications to existing rules based upon the application of game
theoretic tools and new empirical economic methods. The doctrinal adjustments that have
resulted-unilateral effects in merger analysis, raising rivals' costs analysis of exclusion,
and the like-are better understood as further reforms that improve the targeting of
antitrust enforcement efforts than as doctrinal changes conferring monopsony power on
consumers. For a brief survey of post-Chicago possibilities for the evolution of antitrust
doctrine that have been explored by the federal antitrust agencies and the courts, or
suggested in commentary, see Baker, supra note 73, at 70. See a/soJonathan B. Baker, Recent
Developments in Economics that Challenge Chicago School Views, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 645 (1989).
110 See Robert W. Crandall & Clifford Winston, Does Antitrust Policy Improve Consumer
Welfare? Assessing the Evidence, 17J. EcON. PERSP. 1 (2003) (questioning the empirical basis
for antitrust policy without calling for repeal).
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and for good reason"' In short, even if the Chicago School revolution
is understood as an effort by some producer interests to renege on a
political bargain in favor of competition policy, rather than an effort to
reform the antitrust laws, any attempt to hollow out the antitrust laws
ended far short of success.1 2 Many aspects of the competition policy
bargain were modified, but the basic agreement on competition policy
as the appropriate regulatory regime has continued."'
It is possible that this interpretation of the Chicago School revolu-
tion-as reform of counterproductive doctrines but not as a successful
pro-producer rejection of competition as the fundamental domestic
regulatory regime-focuses on the largely intact antitrust edifice without
regard for its crumbling foundations. If so, the most important long-
term political effect of antitrust's shift to an economic approach, and the
concomitant rejection of social and political goals that were important in
antitrust's past, has yet to become apparent in Congress and the courts.
That effect would be in lessening the advantages of competition policy
to small business interests, and so making it more difficult for consumers
to organize politically to oppose any efforts by producer groups to repeal
the antitrust laws. The resulting reduction in political support, in this
111 Baker, supra note 9, at 45.
112 In terms of the political bargain perspective, this outcome could be described as
resulting from the mobilization of governmental actors-including state attorneys general,
Congress, and the courts-on behalf of consumer interests to prevent doctrinal change
from going so far as to overturn the political bargain in favor of competition policy. The
rise of the Chicago School could have an analogous interpretation: as a reaction by
producer interests to a fear that consumer interests during the 1970s were attempting to
renege on the competition policy bargain in favor of a pro-consumer regulatory regime
thatwould seek to deconcentrate major industries. SeeWilliam E. Kovacic, Failed Expectations:
The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the Sherman Act as a Tool for Deconcentration, 74
IOWA L. REv. 1105 (1989); cf Leary, supra note 1, at 109-110 (recounting the reaction
to a 1977 speech by a new FTC Chairman that ascribed broad social and political objectives
to antitrust policy: it "alarmed those opposed to big government generally" as well as
"many mainstream antitrust supporters").
113 In the present political environment, the most plausible route for producers to renege
on the competition policy bargain may involve an expansion of intellectual property rights
in order to constrict the application of the antitrust laws. Antitrust officials from both
parties have spoken out against this possibility. Robert Pitofsky, Challenges of the New Economy:
Issues at the Intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual Property, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 913 (2001)
(views of FTC Chairman during the Clinton administration); FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N,
To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND
POLICY (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/10/cpreport.htm (report issued
during George W. Bush administration). But cf R. Hewitt Pate, Acting Assistant Attorney
General, Antitrust Division, DOJ, Antitrust and Intellectual Property, Speech Before the
AIPLA (Jan. 24, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/200701.
pdf (defending Federal Circuit jurisprudence on the antitrust treatment of refusals to
license as not representing an expansion of intellectual property rights at the expense of
competition, contrary to the claim of former FTC Chairman Pitofsky).
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possible interpretation, could set the stage for political acceptance of
the anti-antitrust views of some conservative political activists.'
1 4
This theory is hard to credit, however, given the limited degree of
lobbying by producer interests for antitrust repeal a quarter-century after
the Chicago School revolution. It also does not account for the extent
to which consumer groups have organized political institutions since
1940, amplifying the political influence of consumer interests."5 In par-
ticular, this theory does not account for the increasing role of state
attorneys general in antitrust enforcement over the past two decades.
The states strengthen consumer interests, to the extent they use their
enforcement authority and political position to help consumers over-
come collective action problems. In addition, business consultants, at
least those with broad, cross-industry perspective, such as Michael Porter
and those associated with the McKinsey Global Institute, may also be
emerging as advocates of competition policy as an institutional mecha-
nism for achieving productivity growth." 6 Accordingly, even from a long
run perspective, the Chicago School revolution appears better described
as an episode of reform rather than repeal and, thus, consistent with
the perspective of a continuing competition policy bargain between
diffuse consumer and producer interests.
In sum, it is tempting but ultimately unconvincing to describe anti-
trust's Chicago School revolution as a successful attempt by producers
to walk away from a political bargain in favor of competition policy,
replacing antitrust with a regulatory regime permitting the exercise of
market power. Rather, the rise of the Chicago School can better be
understood either as reform of the antitrust laws to increase the efficiency
gains from competition and avoid the possibility that the political bargain
114 See, e.g., Americans for Tax Reform, Comments Regarding Commission Issues for
Study (filed before the Antitrust Modernization Commission, Sept. 9, 2004) (letter signed
by Grover G. Norquist), available at http://www.amc.gov/commission-studyissues.htm ("it
seems clear that the antitrust laws, if they ever served a useful purpose, now only exist to
stifle productivity growth and development of new products and services"); Robert Levy,
Antitrust, in CATO HANDBOOK FOR CONGRESS: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE 108TH
CONGRESS § 38 (2002), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/handbook108.
html (calling for repeal of the antitrust laws).
115 Cf Hays, supra note 49, at 153 (before 1940, "competition among producers" was
the primary source of regulatory action, while after World War II, the "role of consumers
began to change from one of passive choosers in the marketplace to collective action in
the political arena").
116 See Jonathan B. Baker & Steven C. Salop, Should Concentration Be Dropped from the
Merger Guidelines?, in ABA ANTITRUST SECTION TASK FORCE REPORT, PERSPECTIVES ON
FUNDAMENTAL ANTITRUST THEORY 339-54 (2001) (recounting comments by Michael
Porter); WILLIAM W. LEWIS, THE POWER OF PRODUCTIVITY: WEALTH, POVERTY, AND




for competition would become disadvantageous for producers, or else
as a thwarted attempt by producers to renege on that political bargain.
Under either of these interpretations, these events are consistent with
the political bargain view of competition policy.
IV. THE WELFARE STANDARD DEBATE
The political bargaining interpretation of competition policy offers a
new perspective on the longstanding debate over what welfare function
antitrust enforcers and courts should maximize.1 7 Today, the welfare
standard question is commonly posed as a choice between two alterna-
tives suggested by the partial equilibrium framework for evaluating wel-
fare effects in individual markets. 1 8 Some contend that conduct should
be evaluated by its harm to aggregate welfare, measured by lost total
surplus (consumers' plus producers' surplus),11 9 while others argue that
it should be tested by its harm to consumers alone, measured by lost
consumers' surplus. 120 On policy grounds, an aggregate surplus standard
117 Welfare issues are discussed using a partial equilibrium framework, consistent with
the convention in commentary. Intermediate buyers are treated as honorary consumers,
as benefits to intermediate buyers are commonly presumed to be passed through, at least
in part, to consumers (although the question could be susceptible to analysis). Hence,
buyer welfare is routinely identified with consumer welfare. The choice of welfare standard,
the question emphasized here, is independent of another contested issue involving the
comparison of benefits and harms not addressed here: whether the victims and beneficiar-
ies of the conduct under review should be treated as an aggregate. The latter issue most
commonly arises when out-of-market benefits are proffered as justification for within-
market harm, regardless of whether a consumer welfare standard or an aggregate welfare
standard is applied. In theory, disputes over the choice of welfare standard and the
permissibility of cross-market tradeoffs could be resolved by identifying the consumption
streams for all individuals resulting from alternative policies and applying a social welfare
function to make the comparison, but this kind of analysis is not practical.
118 In the wake of the Chicago School revolution, the antitrust laws are now most
commonly understood as advancing economic goals, largely excluding social and political
goals that were important in the past. See Baker, supra note 73, at 60-75. For examples
of modern commentary advocating greater attention to a broader range of goals, see
Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence Sullivan, Antitrust-Retrospective and Prospective: Where Are We
ComingFrom? Where Are We Going? 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 936 (1987) (rivalry); Robert H. Lande,
Resurrecting Incipiency: FromVon's Grocery to Consumer Choice, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 875 (2001)
(consumer choice); Stephen F. Ross, Network Economic Effects and the Limits of GTE Sylvania's
Efficiency Analysis, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 875 (2001) (equal economic opportunity); Maurice
E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Antitrust and the Marketplace of Ideas, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 249
(2001) (diversity of voices); Richard Brunell, The Social Costs of Mergers: Restoring "Local
Control" as a Factor in Merger Policy, 85 N.C. L. REv. (forthcoming 2006) (local community
ties). Some of these articles can be understood within an economic approach as calling
attention to certain external costs of promoting competition not accounted for within
the traditional partial equilibrium framework.
119 See, e.g. BORK, supra note 104. Bork uses the confusing terminology of "consumer
welfare" to refer to an aggregate surplus standard.
20 Steven C. Salop, Question: What Is the Real and Proper Antitrust Welfare Standard?
Answer: The True Consumer Welfare Standard (Nov. 2005), available at http://www.
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is defended primarily as increasing social wealth. 121 A consumer surplus
standard is defended primarily on grounds of distributional fairness to
consumers, although the adoption of a consumer welfare standard in
merger enforcement has also been justified on instrumental grounds,
as a way of maximizing aggregate welfare for reasons unconnected with
the political economy considerations highlighted in this article.
122
The two welfare standards commonly lead to the same conclusion as
to whether competition has been harmed by the conduct under review.
1 21
Hard-core cartel conduct, for example, raises prices to consumers, reduc-
ing consumers' surplus while simultaneously reducing aggregate surplus.
But in at least five settings, application of the two standards could
yield different conclusions. The first involves an agreement among rivals
amc.gov/public-studiesfr28902/exclus-conductpdf/051104_Salop-Mergers.pdf; Rob-
ert H. Lande, Chicago's False Foundation: Wealth Transfers (Not Just Efficiency) Should Guide
Antitrust, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 631 (1989); seeJoseph Kattan, Efficiencies and Merger Analysis, 62
ANTITRUST L.J. 513, 528 (1994) (consumer welfare standard is congressionally mandated).
121 Cf Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS AND EFFICIENCY 29-38 (2002)
(arguing that the policy analysis of legal rules outside those governing the tax and transfer
system should generally focus on efficiency considerations rather than distributional ones);
but cf Thomas W. Ross & Ralph A. Winter, The Efficiency Defense in Merger Law: Economic
Foundations and Recent Canadian Developments, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 471, 472-73 (2005) (advo-
cating a merger standard expressed as a weighted sum of producer surplus and consumer
surplus, with the weights chosen to harmonize the degree of redistribution under the
antitrust laws with what a polity has chosen in implementing tax policy). Aggregate surplus
is, at best, only a rough approximation to Pareto efficiency, the welfare concept most
commonly employed by economists.
122 The consumer surplus standard operates as a commitment device employed by anti-
trust enforcers and courts in order to promote aggregate welfare when merging firms are
better able to lobby enforcers than are consumers. Damien J. Neven & Lars-Hendrik
R611er, Consumer Surplus vs. Welfare Standard in a Political Economy Model of Merger
Control (Working Paper, Dec. 2003); Joseph Farrell, Negotiation and Merger Remedies: Some
Problems, in MERGER REMEDIES IN AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW (Francois
Livhque & Howard Shelanski eds., 2004). It also induces firms on average to propose
mergers that generate efficiencies rather than harm competition, given that firms know
more about likely costs savings than do enforcers, David Besanko & Daniel F. Spulber,
Contested Mergers and Antitrust Policy, 9 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (1993); see Joseph Farrell,
Negotiation and Merger Remedies: Some Problems, in MERGER REMEDIES IN AMERICAN AND
EUROPEAN COMPETITION Law, supra (some enforcer hostility to efficiency claims can dis-
courage merging firms from seeking out deals that would confer both efficiencies and
market power), and given that enforcers have difficulty in obtaining the information
necessary to prove the availability of practical less-restrictive alternatives while the merging
firms commonly can restructure contracts easily to obtain efficiencies at less threat of
harm to competition. Salop, supra note 120; Sven-Olof Fridolfsson, A Consumer Surplus
Defense in Merger Control (Feb. 2002), available at http://congrega.fund.uc3m.es/
earie2002/papers/paper_- 309_20020326.pdf.
12 Terry Calvani, Rectangles & Triangles: A Response to Mr. Lande, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 657
(1989); cf. Gary L. Roberts & Steven C. Salop, Efficiencies in Dynamic Merger Analysis, 19
WORLD COMPETITION 5 (1996) (part of the tension between consumer welfare and aggre-
gate welfare standards is resolved by recognizing that efficiencies may be emulated by
rivals and so passed through to consumers).
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(a horizontal merger or joint venture) that reduces competition, result-
ing in higher prices or other consumer harm, such as reduced quality
or lessened likelihood of new product introduction. If, in addition, the
ensuing allocative efficiency loss is less than the production efficiency
benefit that arises from fixed cost savings or from variable cost savings not
passed through to buyers, then the antitrust evaluation of the agreement
turns on the welfare standard. Such an agreement would be considered
harmful under a consumer welfare standard, because prices rose, but
not under an aggregate welfare standard, as aggregate surplus increased
(the production cost savings exceeded the allocative efficiency loss).
Second, suppose that the merger of two inefficient firms would allow
them to lower costs and prices, and so to divert sales from the low-
cost producer. (A high-cost producer can survive because products are
differentiated.) If market demand is relatively inelastic, the allocative
efficiency consequences of the transaction will likely be dominated by
the increase in overall production costs arising from the shift in produc-
tion away from the low-cost firm. Then the merger would be harmful
under an aggregate welfare standard but beneficial under a consumer
welfare standard.
124
Third, the exclusionary conduct of a dominant firm or a group of firms
acting collectively that harms rivals could under some circumstances lead
to lower consumer prices, perhaps by preventing free riding or ending
double marginalization. This conduct would be beneficial if tested under
a consumer welfare standard, because price declines. But under an aggre-
gate welfare standard, the practice could either be beneficial or harmful
on balance. The welfare benefit would include production efficiency
gains from any reduction in marginal cost and an allocative efficiency
gain generated by the expansion of output associated with lower prices.
That benefit would be compared with the welfare loss to the excluded
rivals (their lost producers' surplus). If the welfare loss dominates, 125 the
conduct would be found harmful under an aggregate welfare standard.
126
124 This example was suggested by Steve Salop. It shows that the aggregate welfare
standard is not necessarily more generous to merging firms than the consumer welfare
standard.
125 This could happen, for example, if market demand is relatively inelastic, so any
allocative efficiency gain is small, and the production cost savings are small, while the
exclusionary impact of the conduct is substantial.
126 This example was also suggested by Steve Salop. As the example implies, the aggregate
welfare test calls for a more interventionist approach to exclusion than the consumer
welfare test. However, conservative antitrust commentators who claim to accept the aggre-
gate welfare standard over the consumer welfare standard have not embraced this implica-
tion of their position.
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The fourth setting involves an agreement among end-use consumers
to exercise monopsony power in an input market. Consumer prices
decline, so the agreement is not harmful if tested under a consumer
welfare standard. But the agreement also creates an allocative efficiency
loss, both because output is reduced and because sellers may be led to
invest less in the future than they would have invested in a competitive
market. Hence, the agreement would be considered harmful under an
aggregate welfare standard.
Finally, consider practices that facilitate price discrimination, as by
making it easier for firms to target buyers with different willingness to
pay or by preventing buyer arbitrage. 12 7 The result could be an allocative
efficiency gain along with a reduction in consumers' surplus. 28 If so,
the practices would be considered unreasonable if reviewed under a
consumer welfare standard but reasonable under an aggregate welfare
standard.
The political bargain view of antitrust suggests a role for aggregate
surplus, consumers' surplus, and producers' surplus-a role for all three
welfare concepts-in testing proposed antitrust enforcement actions. In
particular, it suggests that antitrust enforcers and courts should seek
to maximize aggregate surplus, so long as consumers and producers
sufficiently share the efficiency gains, at least on average, in order to
ensure that neither group can do better by reneging on the political
bargain. This condition does not mandate any particular split of the
efficiency gains, so long as consumers on average do at least as well as
they would absent a competition regime and producers on average also
do at least as well as they would absent a competition regime.
Aggregate surplus matters in the stylized story because the efficiency
gains from competition relative to the alternative-regulatory regime
cycles between market power and price controls-help make it possible
for producers and consumers to bargain to a competition regime in
repeated play. But consumers' surplus also matters, as consumers would
organize politically to seek price control regulation unless they are confi-
127 In the airline industry, for example, advance purchase and Saturday night stay require-
ments might be a way of targeting business travelers (who often would not be willing or
able to accept such restrictions) for higher prices, and a requirement that passengers
show identification before boarding may help the airlines prevent leisure travelers from
reselling their tickets to business travelers with higher willingness to pay. The antitrust
treatment of such practices might depend in part on whether they are adopted unilaterally
or by agreement among firms.
1"8 For example, a shift from uniform pricing at a price in excess of marginal cost to
perfect price discrimination would increase aggregate surplus while reducing consumers'
surplus. But it is possible to construct other examples in which instituting price discrimina-
tion increases both consumer and aggregate welfare.
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dent that they will do better under a competition regime. 129 Similarly,
producers' surplus matters. If competition enforcement does not system-
atically protect producers from overly stringent antitrust rules and relief
(and the rules are not reformed when that possibility is threatened),
producers would come to see the political bargain as disadvantageous
and would organize politically to seek repeal of the antitrust laws.
1 30
Of these two constraints, the protection of consumers is by far the
more important one in practice today. Antitrust's Chicago School revolu-
tion was so successful at reorienting antitrust doctrine to protect produc-
ers from enforcement practices and doctrinal rules that might discourage
procompetitive business conduct that it is hard to see how antitrust could
now be used systematically to redistribute wealth away from firms.
1 31
Moreover, when firms complain about antitrust enforcement these days,
they typically argue that aggregate surplus will decline, not that the
antitrust laws are being used improperly to transfer surplus from produc-
ers to consumers.
3 2
In contrast, present-day enforcers and courts should be concerned
more about the possibility that antitrust rules might systematically trans-
fer rents from consumers to firms, by allowing firms to adopt practices
that generate allocative efficiency benefits while reducing consumers'
surplus. 133 Any policy that threatens to undermine consumer confidence
that competition is the superior regulatory option would tend to under-
mine consumer political support for the political bargain in favor of
antitrust.
129 Cf Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM.
ECON. REv. 18, 28 (1968) (transfers from consumers to producers may be regarded
unfavorably because they produce social discontent, with serious efficiency implications).
130 Cf Acemoglu et al., supra note 4, at 59 (examples in which interest groups, some
large and diffuse, have employed their political power to prevent distortionary policies
that would harm their interests); Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Protection for
Sale, 84 AM. ECON. REv. 833, 848 (1994) ("When competition between interest groups is
intense (because their interests are in direct opposition), the availability of an efficient
income-transfer tool makes credible an implicit governmental threat to join forces with
the opposing lobbies. Individual interest groups have little political power under these
conditions, and they prefer to tie the hands of the government.").
13l Such a dramatic change would probably require the active participation of more
than one branch of the government. For example, if the Justice Department were now
to pursue an antitrust enforcement program that aimed to benefit consumers in one
industry after another without regard to the loss of efficiencies and cost to producers, its
efforts would likely be rebuffed in the courts unless either Congress or the Judicial Branch
were persuaded to change the rules.
132 For example, Microsoft's argument that antitrust enforcement against it would dis-
courage innovation and penalize it for success had this character.
13 Cf Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and
Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1020 (1987) (advocating similar standard).
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The 1997 efficiency revisions to the Federal Trade Commission and
Justice Department Horizontal Merger Guidelines strike the right bal-
ance in the wake of antitrust's Chicago School revolution. 34 The Guide-
lines emphasize agency concern with protecting consumers against
mergers that would lead to higher prices.1 35 But the emphasis on consum-
ers is qualified. The agencies note that under some circumstances, they
would count cost savings "with no short-term, direct effect on prices" as
a reason not to challenge the acquisition, 36 thus preserving leeway not
to challenge the rare merger that raises prices while increasing aggregate
surplus. The placement of the qualifying language in the margin sends
the message that the agencies expect to use that discretion only in
unusual cases where the production cost savings or other efficiency gains
are substantial while the loss to consumers appears small.
13 7
1" U.S. Dep't of Justice & Federal Trade Comm'n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 4
(1992, revised 1997), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.htm [hereinafter
Merger Guidelines]. Although I participated in drafting these agency guidelines, my
interpretation is not necessarily that of either federal enforcement agency.
135 This consumer-oriented posture also tends to promote aggregate welfare because
mergers that harm consumers also typically reduce aggregate surplus.
136 Merger Guidelines, supra note 134, § 4 n.37.
17 The Merger Guidelines do not purport to allocate burdens of proof: they merely
provide guidance as to the prosecutorial intentions of the federal enforcement agencies.
One way to deal with burdens consistent with the approach of the Guidelines would be
to treat proof of efficiencies as a "defense" under some circumstances (shifting a burden
of production, not persuasion) and as an "affirmative defense" (shifting both burdens)
under others. In particular, if efficiencies are put forward as evidence tending to disprove
that price would rise (that is, if they are offered to disprove plaintiff theories of coordinated
or unilateral competitive effects), they would play the role of a "defense." By proffering
evidence that the merger would generate efficiencies for this purpose in response to
plaintiff's prima facie case based on market concentration and plaintiff's explanation of
the economic logic by which it believes competition would be harmed, defendant would
shift a burden of production back to plaintiff to demonstrate harm to competition, while
the burden of persuasion would always remain with plaintiff. (This is consistent with the
way that the courts generally treat evidence of ease of entry.) Proof that efficiencies would
be passed on to buyers would be relevant if proof of efficiencies is a "defense" (although
pass-through from intermediate buyers to end use consumers could be presumed). But
if efficiencies are instead proffered as evidence that would excuse higher prices, for
example, through demonstration of cost savings not passed through to buyers or a showing
of lower prices in other markets, defendant would have both a burden of production and
the burden of persuasion. This approach effectively raises defendant's burden when it
seeks to defend its merger under an aggregate welfare standard rather than a consumer
welfare standard. This outcome would be consistent with the implication of the political
bargain perspective in the context of the doctrinal rules adopted in the wake of antitrust's
Chicago School revolution for antitrust's welfare standard: that antitrust should seek to
protect consumers except when the aggregate efficiency costs of doing so would be large.
For elaboration of these points, see Testimony of Jonathan B. Baker Before the Antitrust
Modernization Commission (Nov. 17, 2005), available at http://www.amc.gov/commission
_hearings/merger._enforcement.htm. For discussions of the relationship between the
rationale for crediting efficiencies and the allocation of burdens of proof, see generally
Andrew I. Gavil, Secondary Line Price Discrimination and the Fate of Morton Salt: To Save It
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The studied ambiguity of the Merger Guidelines in resolving the wel-
fare standard issue as it might apply in the review of challenges to
horizontal mergers could be adopted generally in settings in which aggre-
gate welfare and consumer welfare might also be at odds. In these con-
texts too, a qualified emphasis on consumers would be unlikely to
threaten the political bargain in favor of competition. Consumers are
unlikely to organize political opposition to the antitrust laws if enforcers
occasionally challenge an exclusionary practice that reduces prices
slightly but generates so much loss of producers surplus for excluded
rivals as to reduce aggregate welfare, if enforcers occasionally challenge
the collective exercise of monopsony power when the price reduction
is small and the allocative efficiency loss is great, if enforcers decline to
challenge horizontal mergers that would likely raise price slightly when
the aggregate surplus seems likely to increase substantially, or if enforcers
decline to challenge practices facilitating price discrimination when the
price increase to disfavored buyers is small and the allocative efficiency
gains are great.3 8 But if the political constraints are disregarded through
an overbearing enforcement effort or an ostentatious non-enforcement
policy, that choice could ultimately threaten the political bargain that
underlies a competition regime.
The welfare standard dispute has limited practical importance because
harm to consumers and harm to aggregate welfare tend to go hand-in-
hand. Moreover, the lines between consumers and producers are not
distinct-most of us are to some extent both, though we may have a
primary stake in one or the other camp in any individual case. When
controversy arises, however, the political bargain perspective suggests
that enforcers and courts have substantial leeway to maximize aggregate
surplus, within the political constraint that consumers and producers
share the efficiency gains on average across cases.
In recognition of the extensive modifications to antitrust doctrine
implemented during antitrust's Chicago School revolution, which collec-
tively address any serious concern that antitrust rules might be exploited
Let It Go, 48 EMORY L.J. 1057, 1119-20 (1999); Andrew I. Gavil, Exclusionary Distribution
Strategies by Dominant Firms: Striking a Better Balance, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 3, 69-74 (2004).
11 Similarly, producers are unlikely to organize political opposition to the antitrust laws
if enforcers do not challenge exclusionary practices that increase prices slightly but also
raise aggregate welfare substantially, if enforcers decline to challenge the collective exercise
of monopsony power when the price reduction is substantial but the allocative efficiency
loss is not large, if enforcers occasionally challenge horizontal mergers that would likely
raise price substantially even though aggregate surplus seems likely to increase slightly,
or if enforcers occasionally challenge practices facilitating price discrimination when the




by consumers to transfer rents systematically from producers, antitrust
rules could reasonably be enforced today with a qualified emphasis on
consumers: protecting consumers (and other buyers) except when the
aggregate efficiency costs of doing so would be large. This approach
would be expected to protect consumer support for the political bargain
in favor of competition policy without undermining the political support
of producers, while securing most of the economy-wide efficiency gains
available from antitrust enforcement. To those who seek a welfare stan-
dard specified with mathematical precision, this conclusion will seem
unsatisfactory. But that lack of clarity arises because the controversy is
one of politics not economics.
V. CONCLUSION
The main features of the historical evolution of competition policy
in the United States are consistent with the view that the U.S. political
system adopted a competition policy bargain around the middle of the
20th century. Before that time, regulatory regimes fluctuated unstably
between pro-producer policies of industry self-regulation hospitable to
the exercise of market power and pro-consumer policies emphasizing
either national economic planning or the restoration of traditional com-
petition from the era preceding the rise of the large corporation. This
politicized contest over regulatory policy ended mid-century when con-
sumers and producers reached a political bargain to adopt a regime
that protects competition through antitrust enforcement. The antitrust
enforcement regime enhanced aggregate economic welfare relative to
the regulatory instability it displaced.
Once securely adopted, the competition regime has been largely self-
enforcing, with an assist from institutions established to implement the
bargain, including federal and state enforcement agencies and the
courts. Passionate political debates over the economic regulation of large
firms have faded in salience, with the notable exception of the major
change in antitrust policy since the mid-20th century: the rise of the
Chicago School during the late 1970s and 1980s. Those events are better
understood either as reform of the antitrust laws to increase the efficiency
gains from competition and avoid the possibility that the political bargain
for competition would become disadvantageous for producers, or else
as a thwarted attempt by producers to renege on that political bargain,
rather than as a successful effort by producers to induce the political
system to discard competition policy in favor of a pro-producer regime
permitting the exercise of market power. Accordingly, antitrust's Chicago
School revolution reaffirms, rather than undermines, the view that the
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United States had by 1950 adopted competition policy as a political
bargain.
The extensive modifications to antitrust doctrine implemented during
antitrust's Chicago School revolution have collectively addressed any
serious concern that antitrust rules might be exploited by consumers to
transfer surplus systematically from producers, without undermining the
effectiveness and independence of the enforcement agencies. Accord-
ingly, antitrust rules could reasonably be enforced today with a qualified
emphasis on consumers: protecting consumers except when the aggre-
gate efficiency costs of doing so would be large. This approach would help
protect consumer support of the political bargain in favor of competition
policy without undermining the political support of producers, while
securing most of the economy-wide efficiency gains available from anti-
trust enforcement.
APPENDIX
This Appendix sets forth a mathematical example demonstrating how
competition policy can emerge politically as a self-enforcing bargain
between competing interest groups. Voters are viewed as adopting a
primary loyalty to one of two interest groups: producers or consumers.
The fraction 3 of voters are consumers, while the fraction 1 - P are
producers. Consumers are in the majority: P > 1/2. Differences among
types of consumers or producers (such as small business vs. large busi-
ness) are ignored. 39 These two interest group actors interact repeatedly
in the legislature. An interest group's collective political influence in
the legislature is taken to turn both on its nominal size as a voting bloc
and on its ability to mobilize votes by overcoming free-riding problems.
140
A period lasts from one meeting of the legislature to the next.
All political decision making takes place in the legislature, which selects
a regulatory regime from among three options: competition (generated
by antitrust enforcement), market power, and price controls. The market
power and price controls regimes can be understood as special interest
legislation by which producers or consumers, respectively, exploit a legis-
lative majority to appropriate rents from the other interest group. The
competition regime permits the economy to obtain efficiency gains
unavailable under the market power or price controls regimes.
Single-period payoffs to interest group members depend on the regula-
tory regime. Payoffs are expressed as per capita (per voter) consumption,
normalized so that the single-period payoffs under competition to both
producers and consumers are set at unity. Single-period payoffs to pro-
ducers and consumers are represented by H and K, respectively, with
superscripts for the possible regulatory regimes of market power (MP)
"I The possibility that some consumers or firms would care more about long-term
consequences than others is also ignored; a single, common discount rate will be assumed.
"4 A similar perspective is reflected in the "political influence functions" postulated by
Gary Becker. Becker, Competition AmongPressure Groups, supra note 27; Becker, Public Policies,
Pressure Groups, and Dead Weight Costs, supra note 27. Becker specifies a general equilibrium
model of political interaction, in which interest groups compete to produce redistribu-
tion in their favor. By contrast, the example in this Appendix illustrates the consequences
of interest group interactions when adverse past policies promote current political
mobilization.
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and price controls (PC). In any period, producers prefer market power to
competition, and competition to price controls: -mp > 1 > lipc. Consumers
prefer the reverse: Kpc > 1 > Kmp. Both price controls and market power
result in an efficiency loss, so [Jmp + Kmp < 2 and lipc + Kpc < 2. The
distribution of the efficiency loss between interest groups is, by assump-
tion, not wildly asymmetric. In particular, producers and consumers
would each prefer a stable competitive regime to alternating between
market power and price control regimes: lI mp + 1Ipc < 2 and Kpc + Kmp < 2.
The disparity between single-period per capita payoffs in the most and
least attractive regulatory regimes for producers is assumed to exceed
the disparity in the number of actors in each interest group: [I'mp/-I pc]
> I P/0 - M.
Each interest group can marshal votes in the legislature for its favored
proposal,' 4' but interest group size in the electorate does not translate
proportionally to votes in the legislature because of differences in the
success of each group in overcoming collective action problems. Consum-
ers and producers are both viewed as large and diffuse interest groups,
for which collective action problems may be particularly severe. 42 Each
interest group's ability to overcome its collective action difficulties is by
assumption related to the per capita stakes in the vote for that group.
These ideas are formalized by introducing V i, an index number sum-
marizing the strength of the voting coalition that interest group i (either
consumers or producers) can assemble in the legislature in favor of a
particular legislative proposal for a regulatory regime. V i is conditional
on the prior regulatory regime and is written: Vi(proposed regulatory
regime; prior regulatory regime). The two interest groups, producers
and consumers, are denoted P and C, respectively. The three possible
regulatory regimes, of market power, competition, and price controls,
are denoted MP, CM, and PC, respectively. For example, the index
number related to the legislature votes assembled by consumers in favor
of switching the regulatory regime to price controls from market power
is represented as Vc(PC; MP).
Votes in the legislature take the form of a choice between the regula-
tory regime proposed by one interest group and the regime favored by
another. In any such head-to-head comparison, the legislative victory
I41 The extensive empirical literature on the extent to which legislators act as agents of
their constituents and contributors is surveyed in DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE
III § 20.3 (2003).
142 OLSON, supra note 3. Were it not for such difficulties, consumers, with a majority in
the polity, would invariably enact the proposals they favor in the legislature.
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goes to the proposal with the highest index number. 143 (The possibility
of a tie is ignored.) Thus, a proposal that the regulatory regime switch
to price controls (favored by consumers) from market power (favored
by producers) will be victorious in the legislature if Vc(Pc; MP) >
VP(MP; MP).
The index number V i (proposed regulatory regime; prior regulatory
regime) is assumed to be computed in a specific way. Its magnitude
depends in part on the fraction of voters in interest group i, a measure
of the size of the interest group. That fraction is adjusted multiplicatively
to account for a measure of the per capita stakes for group members in
switching to the proposed regulatory regime from the prior one. The
stakes are measured by the present discounted value of the future stream
of payoffs resulting from permanent legislative adoption of a regulatory
regime, normalized by the present value of the payoffs that would result
were the prior regulatory regime to continue permanently. Consumers
and producers are each assumed to discount the future at the identical
rate 6 (that is, they value 1 next period at 6 today), for 0 < 6 < 1.
Accordingly, for example, the index reflecting consumer votes in favor
of switching from a market power regime to a price control regime takes
the following form:
Vc(PC; MP) = P[18iKc/X]iKmP] = P[AKpc/AKP] = P[KPc/K1P],
iMl i=l
whereA= 1 +6+5 2 + 
5 +...+8+....
Because per-period payoffs are constant over time, the terms related to
discounting drop out.
Mathematically, the index V i will be greater than the interest group's
fraction of the voting population (e.g., greater than P for consumers)
if the group does better under the legislative proposal than with a contin-
uation of the prior regime. The index will be smaller than the group's
fraction of voting population if the group does less well under the
proposal than with a continuation of the prior regime. This functional
form incorporates the assumption that a diffuse interest group's success
4I To specify legislative behavior fully, this decision rule may be understood as derived
from a prior assumption that the legislative votes each proposal achieves depends on the
relative index number. Thus, if consumers favor price controls while producers favor
market power, and the market power regime was in force during the previous period,
then a proposal by consumers to switch to price controls would receive the fraction Vc(Pc;
MP)/ [Vc(PC; MP) + VP(MP; MP)] of legislative votes. Under a majoritarian voting rule,
the outcome of legislative contests between a pair of alternatives is then determined
directly by a comparison of index numbers, without need to compute the fraction of the
vote each proposal receives.
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in solving its collective action problems in order to mobilize politically
is greater when the existing regulatory regime is adverse than when it
is neutral or favorable. For example, Vc(PC; MP) = P[KPc/KmP] > Vc(PC;
PC) = VC(MP; MP) = P > Vc(MP; PC) = P[KmP/KPc].
Within this framework, the legislature chooses a regulatory regime.
The first set of results, set forth in Propositions 1 through 3, assume
that the legislature can achieve only the outcomes available through
one-shot play. Proposition 4 allows for repeated play, from which the
possibility of committing to a future regulatory regime could emerge as
an outcome. The propositions are stated without proof.
144
If the legislature is unable to commit to a future regulatory regime,
the legislative decision as to regulation during any period is driven by
political reaction. In particular, the outcome of the stage game, the one-
shot interaction in any period, is controlled by the increased organizing
ability of the group that lost in the previous period. There are three
cases, each corresponding to a different regulatory regime that could
have been adopted in the previous period. Propositions 1 through 3 set
forth the stage game results.
Proposition I
In a one-shot interaction, if the prior period regulatory regime
permitted the exercise of market power, then a price controls regime
would be adopted.
Proposition 2
In a one-shot interaction, if the prior period regulatory regime
involved price controls, then a regime permitting the exercise of
market power would be adopted.
Proposition 3
In a one-shot interaction, if the prior period regulatory regime
involved competition, then either a regime permitting the exercise
of market power or a price controls regime would be adopted.
These propositions concerning the outcome of one-shot interactions
imply that if the legislature is unable to commit to a future regulatory
regime, the regulatory regime will cycle between price controls and
market power. Regulatory cycles occur from the start, or after one period
if competition were the initial condition. The cycles are driven by the
assumption that the losers in the past are better able to organize today.
144 Proofs are available from the author upon request.
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The order will depend on the regime that characterized the past, as set
forth in the following table:
Next Future
Past Period Regime Present Period Regime Period Regime
market power price controls market power
price controls market power price controls
competition either either
A) price controls or A) market power






The cycle continues through later future periods. Competition would
never be adopted, so the last line of the table applies only if the initial
period, presented by history, was competitive. Even when a competition
regime is preferable to cycling for both groups, it cannot be achieved
in a one-shot interaction because the interest group that can enact its
most preferred policy in any period will do so.
The result that competition cannot be obtained through one-shot
play, even though it maximizes aggregate payoffs, is at variance with the
literature suggesting that competing interest groups will tend to bargain
to achieve (and split) efficiency gains. 45 That outcome does not occur
here for two reasons. First, neither interest group can credibly commit
to seeking a competitive regulatory regime rather than one in which it
would exploit market power. 146 Second, the losing interest group cannot
solve its collective action problems as well as can the winner, making it
145 See, e.g., Becker, Competition Among Pressure Groups, supra note 27; Becker, Public Policies,
Pressure Groups, and Dead Weight Costs, supra note 27. As a general theory of regulation,
however, this view is hard to reconcile with the many studies that identify regulatory
inefficiencies. See Noll, supra note 62, at 1273-74 (surveying studies finding inefficient
regulatory outcomes); cf Acemoglu, supra note 30 (explaining why politically powerful
groups do not maximize social wealth before appropriating rents).
'4 This point is similar to recognizing that competition is the dominant strategy for two
actors in a one-shot "prisoner's dilemma" interaction, even though both would benefit
were they to cooperate, because neither can commit not to cheat.
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impossible for the two groups to negotiate the side payments that would
be necessary to obtain the forgone gains from trade.
147
By contrast, repeated play may permit the legislature to adopt a compe-
tition regime and avoid these cycles. 48 Proposition 4 below demonstrates
that with infinitely repeated play, competition is enforceable for a suffi-
ciently high discount rate. By assumption, if the legislature deviates from
a policy of protecting competition, whether at the behest of either
producers or consumers, a competition regime cannot be renegotiated;
regulatory instability (a cycle between market power and price controls)
follows forever. Deviation from the coordinated outcome is deterred
because it would be punished by reversion to less-attractive regulatory
instability.
As before, the voting index (for an interest group with respect to a
regulatory proposal) multiplies the fraction of voters in the group by a
measure of the per capita stakes in switching to that proposal for the
group. Again, the stakes are measured in terms of the discounted present
value of the payoffs resulting from permanent legislative adoption of a
regulatory regime, normalized by the discounted present value of the




Competition is supported by the threat of reversion to regulatory
cycles in an infinitely repeated legislative interaction, for a suffi-
ciently high discount rate.
147 See Acemoglu et al., supra note 4, at 42 ("If those who gained political power from
institutional change could promise to compensate those who lost power then there would
be no incentive to block better institutions."). This point is similar to the observation that
consumers do not routinely bargain with cartels to obtain and share the additional gains
from trade that would arise from increasing output to the competitive level.
148 Infinitely repeated competition between political parties can similarly make possible
a welfare-enhancing, self-enforcing bargain between them. Alberto Alesina, Credibility and
Policy Convergence in a Two-Party System with Rational Voters, 78 AM. EcoN. Rrv. 796 (1988)
(parties competing for votes converge in their policies when repeated play permits them
to make credible post-election promises); Avinash Dixit, Gene M. Grossman & Faruk Gul,
The Dynamics of Political Compromise, 108J. POL. EcoN. 531 (2000) (generalizing Alesina's
result to a case in which parties' political strength changes according to a Markov process);
cf Acemoglu, supra note 30, at 643 (Proposition 4) (similar result in repeated interaction
between citizens and rulers).
149The results would not change if, when the prior regulatory regime was price controls
or market power, the present value of the payoff to the new regime were normalized by
the present value of the payoffs that would result were the regulatory regime to cycle




Proposition 4 is an application of the Folk Theorem for infinitely
repeated games. 50 The Folk Theorem demonstrates that any payoff that
dominates the best payoffs actors can receive if they are being punished
by rivals can be sustained in infinitely repeated play if the actors care
sufficiently about the future. In the example, the competition regime
offers the only Pareto superior payoff option available to the two interest
groups. Accordingly, Proposition 4 has the interpretation that competi-
tion is sustainable through repeated interaction if it can be negotiated.' 5'
150 See, e.g., DRw FUDENBERG &JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY 152 (1991) (Theorem 5.1).
The notion of infinitely repeated games for which the Folk Theorem applies includes
finitely repeated games with an uncertain termination date. See ERIC RASMUSSEN, GAMES
AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 124-26 (2d ed. 1989) (Theo-
rem 5.1).
151 As with similar Folk Theorem results, the proposition does not show that the competi-
tive regime will be adopted; it merely shows if competition is adopted, neither interest
group would have an incentive to seek an alternative regulatory regime.
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